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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the question of whether the anonymization of broker identifiers has an 
effect on market quality through the natural experiment on the Australian Securities 
Exchange. We show that the removal of broker identifiers on the ASX has a significant 
impact on the market quality measures. We confirm that the removal of broker identifiers 
effects on a fall in traded value, an increase in transaction costs and an increase in intraday 
volatility. Results indicate that the large special crossings exhibit the best market quality 
measures in the anonymous regime. Specifically, there is a strong signal that the better 
informed institutions and their brokers, who are mostly active in the larger stocks gain more 
advantage from their position after the market reform. Further, we obtain strong results that 
larger firms benefit more from a transparent market. We conclude that there is value in 
greater pre-trade transparency in the form of the disclosure of broker identification. 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
The issue of the optimal level of market transparency has been a controversial topic among 
practitioners, academics and financial exchanges around the world. Market transparency is 
defined as “the ability of market participants to observe information in the trading process” 
(O’Hara (1995)). Competition for order flow has seen a proliferation of financial exchanges 
adopt distinct sets of trading mechanisms to rule the structure and speed of information flow 
among market participants. In recognizing the importance of market transparency and its 
ramifications, some stock markets like the European exchanges have even converged to 
operate dual market structures within a single financial exchange to allow market participants 
to trade in the appropriate structure that is suited based on their intended trade sizes (Pagano 
(1997)). This is also evident in exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
whereby smaller transactions trade in the highly transparent downstairs market whereas block 
or larger trades are allowed to trade in the less transparent upstairs market. It is obvious that 
financial exchanges see the importance to provide a certain degree of transparency both 
among and within financial exchanges.   
Information, described as a major component in the definition of market transparency may be 
observed either before a trade takes place or after the clearance of a trade. We refer to the 
former as pre-trade transparency and the latter as post-trade transparency.  
Pre-trade transparency is the amount of information that is available publicly for all market 
participants before a trade takes place or is cleared. Following the broad definition of O’Hara 
(1995), such observable information can be in the form of current and past prices, quotes, 
traded volume, order flow, traders’ identities and their motivations. Thus, we can see that 
within the simple definition of pre-trade transparency lies a complex characterization of 
information. Post-trade transparency refers to the availability of information relating to a 
cleared transaction among market participants. In the context of transparency, equity markets 
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are often evaluated on the basis of pre-trade transparency (U.S SEC, yr). Therefore, the 
following discussion shall mainly focus on the issue of pre-trade transparency.   
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has constantly emphasized the importance of 
market transparency as a key feature of market design (Chester (2005)). The U.S.SEC (1994) 
persists the conviction that increasing transparency improves price discovery, 
competitiveness, attractiveness and fairness of a market. According to Huisman et. al (1998), 
“the transparency regime of a trading mechanism directly controls the amount of asymmetric 
information in the market and has important implications for the strategic behaviour of 
agents”. Ultimately, this is reflected in variables like liquidity and price efficiency which 
differentiates the market quality across financial exchanges.  
International practices in most financial exchanges implicitly suggest a trend towards greater 
transparency. However, the question remains: Given that different types of market 
participants exist, how transparent should a market be in order to satisfy all these diverse 
needs? As this is a challenging issue, financial exchanges around the world still adopt 
differing levels of pre-trade transparency due to variant views on what is the optimal level of 
transparency for an efficient market. In general, auction markets are more transparent than 
dealer markets. In multiple dealer markets like the Nasdaq and the London Stock Exchange 
Automated Quotation system (SEAQ), brokers and agents of the stock exchanges are able to 
observe the bid and ask quotes of competing dealers electronically. However, these quotes 
are mainly indicative and mostly will be improved upon by the market makers through 
telephone negotiations. In contrast, in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), information 
on the limit order book for all NYSE traded instruments is disseminated to all market 
participants through the NYSE OpenBook. Market participants are able to observe the 
aggregate limit order volume at each bid and offer price in all NYSE-listed securities. The 
brokers are able to observe the exact price at which an order will be executed. All traders are 
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able to observe in real-time the market depth of the NYSE securities beyond the best bid and 
offer, thus achieving a higher level of pre-trade transparency. Similarly, the Paris Bourse 
operates a very transparent electronic limit order book that allows brokers to obtain 
information on quotes and volumes from all existing limit orders. Asia-Pacific exchanges like 
the Taiwan Stock Exchange has shifted from a regime whereby the entire limit order book 
was closed to a regime whereby the five best bid and ask orders and their order volumes are 
disclosed ever since 2003. Similarly, exchanges like the Bursa Malaysia, the Hong Kong 
Exchanges and Clearing and the Tokyo Stock Exchange have also increased the level of 
quotes and volumes disclosed by their limit order book.  
In studying the effects of market transparency, extant literature has focused mainly on the 
disclosure of information like trade volumes and prices. Despite the general consensus that 
transparency of these information impacts market quality, the net effect of such data 
transparency remains ambiguous (Waisburd (2003)). Following the wide definition of market 
transparency in O’Hara (1995), transaction data is only one dimension of pre-trade 
information that is valuable. The identity of brokers who submitted the order is also an 
important information component which has important implications for market efficiency and 
investors confidence.  
Therefore, this thesis provides an attempt to discuss the impact of pre-trade transparency 
reflected by the disclosure of broker identities on market quality. In this thesis, broker 
identity reflects pre-trade transparency, whereby traders can observe the identity of the broker 
who is submitting trade orders or making trades. Following Maher et. al (2008), this is a form 
of enforced “sunshine trading” whereby the broker’s identity pre-announced prior to trading 
reveals information on whom the broker is acting on behalf of and whether the trade is likely 
to be informed. In accordance with Comerton-Forde et. al (2005), this thesis recognizes that 
broker identity possess information content. The ability to identify the corresponding broker 
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allows traders to infer order flow information, trading motivations and the like. However, 
information on broker identities is also likely to have implications for herding or mimicking 
of trades (Maher et. al (2008)). 
The fundamental issue addressed by this thesis is to examine whether the trading 
environment of the limit order book and the overall market is affected when brokers are 
allowed to keep their identities confidential. This effect is examined through the removal of 
broker identifiers on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) on 28 November 2005. Trading 
on the ASX can take place through the limit order book or via off-market. In accordance with 
the classification by ASX, this thesis classifies the limit order trades into those that are 
represented by different brokers (i.e. LOB,DBrok trades) and those represented by the same 
brokers (i.e. LOB,SBrok trades). The LOB,SBrok trades are also known as on-market crossed 
and internalized trades. . Internalisation occurs when a broker-dealer takes the opposite side 
of a client’s trade and reports the trade to the automated trading system with the same broker 
identity representing both buyer and seller. A crossed trade is defined as a trade whereby a 
broker-dealer finds the client for both sides of a trade and reports the trade to the automated 
trading system with the same broker identity representing both buyer and seller. As defined 
by the ASX, there are two main categories of crossings, on-market crossings and special 
crossings. An on-market crossing occurs when the broker has a buyer and a seller who wish 
to trade at the same price. Off-market crossed trades are defined as special crossings (i.e. 
SpCross), which forms the final category of trade type examined in this thesis. SpCross trades 
pertain to larger trades and portfolios, which are simply crossed trades that occurs off-market 
at any time. Depending upon the type, the minimum consideration required ranges between 
$1 million and $5 million. 
We assert that the market quality for these three categories of trades will exhibit difference 
after the change in the trading protocol. Also, to the extent that broker identity contains 
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valuable information, we hypothesize that there will be a shift of liquidity to the crossed and 
internalized trades and special crossings. This leads us on to the tasks of this thesis. Our first 
objective is to examine if the removal of broker identifiers is appropriate for shares typically 
traded on the ASX. If the change in trading protocol is more appropriate, the market quality 
measures for the overall market will improve in the anonymous regime.  
We are also motivated to know if the removal of broker identifiers causes a shift of liquidity 
to the crossed and internalized and special crossings trades. This motivation stems from the 
underlying analogy: Since broker identifiers are automatically restored in the trades 
represented by the same brokers, these trades should be less affected by the change in trading 
protocol. Also, if broker identifiers do contain valuable information, there will be a higher 
preference for the trades represented by the same brokers. To our knowledge, the current 
literature has not examined this issue of the shift of liquidity to the crossed and internalized 
trades and special crossings. This forms our second objective: If this shift of liquidity exists, 
do the crossed and internalized trades and special crossings exert a negative externality on the 
limit order book and the overall market in the form of lower market quality in the latter trades. 
We do this by comparing the market quality of the trades represented by the same brokers (i.e. 
LOB,SBrok and SpCross) to those represented by different brokers (i.e. LOB,DBrok) 
Throughout the thesis, these abbreviations will be used to represent the respective types of 
trades. If the crossed and internalized trades and special crossings do exert a negative 
externality, they should exhibit higher market quality in comparison to the limit order trades 
represented by different brokers.  
The results of this thesis indicate that the market reform impacts on a fall in traded value, 
higher transaction costs and an increase in intraday volatility for the overall market. We find 
support for the shift of liquidity to the large special crossings off-market in the anonymous 
regime. This shift of liquidity exerts additional negative externality on the limit order book 
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and the overall market after the anonymization of broker identifiers. We find that informed 
trading increases in large stocks. Our results show that there is value inherent in the 
disclosure of broker identities.  
The layout of the rest of the thesis is as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review. The 
institutional details of the Australian Securities Exchange are discussed in Section 3. This is 
followed by the formulation of the hypotheses relating to the thesis study in Section 4. 
Section 5 contains data description and the research design used for the purpose of this study. 
Section 6 contains the discussion of the results. Finally, the thesis is rounded up with a 
conclusion that is contained in Section 7.  
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2   LITERATURE REVIEW  
There is relatively little research work done on the issue of broker identity disclosure. Thus 
far, the current literature has not reached a coherent view on whether broker identity 
transparency or opacity is more advantageous. Following Sugato (2001), this thesis believes 
that if broker identities do represent important pre-trade information, then disclosure of 
broker identities may have similar consequences to the disclosure of transaction prices and 
quantities.  
In this section, a review on the current literature on pre-trade broker identity disclosure will 
be examined. In addition, other studies with regards to pre-trade transparency in the form 
other than broker identity disclosure will also be used as a guide in the formulation of the 
relevant hypotheses. This section shall consist of both theoretical and empirical findings in 
the current literature on the merits of broker identity versus opacity.  
2.1   PRE-TRADE TRANSPARENCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
Globally, extensive interest has been generated in the relation between market transparency 
and market quality. Market quality refers to the ability to trade at low cost, ability to trade in 
large quantities and the ability to trade at “fair” information-efficient equilibrium prices that 
quickly converge to their information-efficient value.  In the current literature, one school of 
thought proposes that increased pre-trade transparency increases market quality. According to 
Sankar et. al (2007), transparency allows traders to trade with more confidence and hence 
increases market liquidity. In addition, transparency allows prices to reflect extant 
information, thus producing information-efficient market prices (Sankar et. al (2007)). 
However, Sankar et. al (2007) asserts that the benefits of greater transparency are conditioned 
by the reluctance of informed traders and liquidity suppliers to trade in an overly-transparent 
market structure. This proposition is evident in Sankar et. al (2007) whereby majority of 
11 
 
informed traders and financial institutional investors prefer restricted pre-trade transparency 
when they are supplying liquidity in the limit order book and prefer significantly lower pre-
trade transparency when their orders and trades impound information. Clearly, the optimal 
level of pre-trade transparency is largely dependent on the needs of different types of traders 
and on the characteristics of the financial instrument that is being traded (Huisman et. al 
(1998)).  
Proponents of pre-trade transparency assert that information disclosure facilitates lower 
search costs and lesser information asymmetry in the market. “Transparency should lead 
to greater commonality of information. Greater commonality of information means that 
adverse selection becomes less of an issue” (Glosten (1999)). From a practitioner’s view, 
increased pre-trade transparency reduces the costs of searching for a counterparty and 
mitigates market uncertainty. In other words, a more transparent market is desirable because 
it helps to reduce adverse selection, which encourages uninformed investors to participate in 
the market, and thus facilitates risk sharing (Naik et. al (1999)). With these positive attributes, 
greater order flow is attracted in the financial exchange, thereby increasing market liquidity. 
By using an experimental methodology, Flood et. al (1998) demonstrates specifically how the 
degree of pre-trade transparency in the form of quote disclosure, affects the strategies of 
market makers, which is reflected in the bid-ask spreads, volume and the price discovery 
process. Flood et. al (1998) utilises a computerized experimental securities market, which 
comprises of seven professional market makers and two robots acting as non-market-makers. 
Two market structures, namely a transparent and an opaque market structure are built. In the 
first four rounds, in the transparent market structure, all market makers are able to observe all 
outstanding quoted bid and ask prices publicly on their respective trading screens. In the final 
four rounds, in the opaque market structure, a market maker wishing to obtain the quotes of 
another market maker has to “call” through the trading system to obtain the price quotes as 
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they are not disclosed publicly. In addition, given the prior knowledge of the probability of 
informed robots, the market makers utilise the robot’s transactions to infer price information. 
For example, if an informed robot sells, there is a high probability that the trader’s bid price 
is above the true asset price. The experimental results document narrower opening spreads 
and larger trading volume in the transparent market, depicting that the transparent market is 
more liquid than the opaque structure. Flood et. al (1998) argues that the discrepancy in 
liquidity between the transparent and the opaque structure is particularly evident in the 
opening trading period due to difference in search costs and informational asymmetry. 
However, this reduced search costs causes these dealers to exhibit less aggressive price 
adjustments in the transparent market, thus having a slower price discovery process. This is in 
contention with Huisman et. al (1998) that in a transparent regime, dealers use less aggressive 
price adjustments in inventory management, thereby slowing price discovery and reducing 
the price efficiency of the market. The trade-off between liquidity and price efficiency due to 
the different levels of information disclosure in separate markets, serves as an explanation for 
the differing views on the issue of pre-trade transparency. 
In addition to the improvement in liquidity, advocates in favour of pre-trade transparency, 
argues that its existence enables fewer, if not, none of the traders to enjoy any possessed 
monopoly power in the market. For instance, as dealers are aware of each other’s positions in 
a transparent market, no single dealer shall possess any superior information and thus will 
compete more effectively among one another. Further, in a transparent market, market 
makers obtain information from the disclosed trades more quickly, thereby being able to set 
the prices more efficiently (Bloomfield et. al (1999)). In January 24, 2002, the NYSE made 
the limit-order book transparent to the public in real time during trading hours. In 
demonstrating the effect of this decision made by the NYSE, Baruch (2005) developed a 
theoretical model to show that such pre-trade transparency reduces the bid-ask spreads and 
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increases the informational efficiency of prices. The model also shows that with increased 
transparency, liquidity suppliers (i.e. specialists and limit-order traders) can no longer make 
use of their informational advantage to exploit rents. This causes all limit-order traders to 
compete more effectively with the specialists. Specifically, their results show that in a 
sufficiently large market, all market order traders shall benefit from a transparent limit-order 
book. Also, a transparent open limit order book lowers the price impact of these market 
orders, enabling lower trading costs.    
The above arguments for the presence of market transparency are compelling. However, 
academics have further debated that the benefits of providing additional pre-trade disclosure 
may be beneficial only to a certain equilibrium point. Beyond that, the benefits of pre-trade 
transparency may be diminishing. This is evident in the findings of Kyong et. al (2007) 
which utilise the change in the disclosure policy made by the Korea Exchange (KRX) in 
years 2000 and 2002 to exhibit the effects of pre-trade transparency on market quality. In the 
move to improve market quality, the KRX increased the level of quote disclosure in 2000, 
from 3 to 5, providing greater market transparency. In 2002, two changes were invoked. 
Firstly, the KRX “expanded” the 2000 event and continued to increase the number of 
publicly disclosed quotes on each side of the market from 5 to 10. Secondly, the KRX 
stopped disclosing the sum of the numbers of shares offered or sought at all prices on each 
side of the order book. Kyong et. al (2007) emphasizes that this non-disclosure is a move by 
the KRX to provide disclosed information with better quality; the 2002 event must be viewed 
as an increase in pre-trade transparency. Using a panel-data analysis, findings show that 
following the two events, market quality is increasing in pre-trade transparency. In addition, 
the improvement in market quality after the 2002 event is significantly lower than the 2000 
event, demonstrating that the benefits associated with increased pre-trade transparency is 
diminishing beyond a certain point.  
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On the other hand, there exists another standpoint that in a market with readily observable 
information, market makers have less incentive to pay (i.e. by buying for more or selling for 
less) to capture information that may be obtained by trading with an informed trader. This is 
in contention with Madhavan (1995) which predicts that in less transparent markets, dealers 
are willing to price more aggressively in the opening trading rounds in order to compete for 
trade information like security value and active traders’ net demand to be exploited for later 
rounds of trading. In an experimental setting, Bloomfield et. al (1999) show that increased 
trade disclosure is indeed accompanied by wider opening bid-ask spreads, which increases 
trading costs. Bloomfield et. al (1999) attributes the wider spreads to the fact that in a 
transparent market, market makers no longer see the need to compete for order flow in 
order to get information like the security value and active traders’ net demand. However, 
this adverse impact on transparency on spreads becomes lesser in the later rounds of trading 
as more and more information is impounded into market prices. Interestingly, Bloomfield et. 
al (1999) also finds that a transparent market is proven to be more informational efficient. 
Improved informational efficiency occurs as the midpoint of the market bid and ask spread 
converges to its true value more quickly (Bloomfield et. al (1999)). Therefore, when 
considering the issue of the degree of transparency in market design, one should recognise 
the trade off between increased informational efficiency and increased trading costs.  
Despite widely held beliefs that uniformed traders prefer to trade in a more transparent 
market, there exists another sophisticated argument against increased transparency which 
asserts that uninformed traders prefer to trade in a less transparent regime as they are able to 
hide their liquidity needs from the market. In examining this issue, Roell (1990) explains that 
market makers may purposely set higher prices in knowing that these uninformed traders 
demand for immediacy. 
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Market transparency is also known to have an impact on dealer’s inventory control costs 
despite no attainment of a final view on its effect. On one hand, studies have shown that in a 
transparent market, dealers find it more difficult to lay off their positions as other traders 
might execute spoiling tactics at the expense of these dealers (Gemmill (1996)). In contrast, 
Naik et. al (1999) asserts that trade transparency helps in reducing inventory control costs. 
This is because greater trade transparency aids the achievement of an optimal quantity risk 
sharing attributable to the fact that dealers are not able to manipulate the beliefs of other 
traders in market with greater information disclosure. 
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2.2   INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF BROKER IDENTITIES 
The question of whether broker identifiers be displayed or removed remains a complex and 
on-going debate. The financial exchange is an institution that consists of different types of 
market participants with varying needs and characteristics. Firstly, uninformed traders like 
small or retail investors prefer to have disclosed broker identifiers that allow them to enjoy 
lower trading costs. Secondly, institutional investors fearing that their exposed trades will be 
subjected to manipulation prefer to trade in an anonymous market. Thirdly, companies are 
concerned with enhancing the liquidity of their stock, leading to higher stock prices. Lastly, 
financial exchanges around the world compete fiercely for order flow. No doubt, in designing 
the level of disclosure of broker identities, a financial exchange has to consider the differing 
objectives of various market participants. As Domowitz et .al (2001) argues, too little 
transparency attracts informed traders or corporate insiders, reducing liquidity and increasing 
price volatility. However, they contend that excessive transparency causes fear among traders 
that their orders may be exploited and therefore reduces the market’s order flow. Given the 
benefits of the increased level of liquidity and informational content, it is undoubted that 
there should exits some level of pre-trade transparency in financial exchanges. However, in 
integrating this level of pre-trade transparency, exchanges have to implement rules to protect 
traders from manipulation tactics or front runners. Certainly, this remains a challenging, yet 
imperative issue to regulators around the world. 
Analogous to the differing views on the optimal level of pre-trade data like prices and order 
quantities, the optimal level of broker identification has continued to ignite ambiguous views 
among academics and regulators. In light of this, financial exchanges around the world have 
adopted differing sets of broker identity disclosure rules. This has led stock exchanges to 
either move towards a more transparent or anonymous market structure.  
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The differing views on the importance of broker identities is seen in the way some financial 
exchanges allow disclosure of broker identities while others conceal these identities. In 28 
November 2005, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) ceased the display of broker 
identities as part of its reform to the equity market (ASX (2005)). Prior to this, brokers were 
able to see the identity of the broker or firm placing an order or making a trade through a 
broker identifier code. With effect from 28 November 2005, all broker identifier codes are 
replaced with a generic identifier “777-7”. This reform is motivated by the ASX’s view that 
all market participants should have fair access to information3. The ASX believes that the 
disclosure of broker identifiers encourages predatory trading behaviour and increases trading 
costs. It believes that the removal of broker identifiers on the ASX will lead to a more 
efficient, fair price discovery process and attracts more liquidity. Ever since, this initiative 
has sparked differing views among market participants. Majority of the institutional brokers 
have shown their support for this reform as anonymity allows them to place large orders 
without the fear of front running traders (Knight (2005))2. However, there remains fierce 
argument among retail brokers who believe that broker identification should be inherent in 
the trend towards greater market pre-trade transparency seen in most global financial 
exchanges (Knight (2005))2. The Tokyo Stock Exchange, Euronext Paris and Euronext 
Brussels also do not provide disclosure of broker identifiers on their exchanges.  
In contrast, in October 1999, the Korea Stock Exchange introduced the disclosure of broker 
identifiers on all limit orders in the move towards greater pre-trade transparency. In the 
middle ground exists some exchanges like the Toronto Stock Exchange which delegate 
brokers the right to remain anonymous or to display their identity to potential counterparties. 
In addition, more sophisticated trading platforms like automated markets do not disclose 
broker identity at all. 
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Broker identity is said to contain valuable information that might otherwise not be obtained. 
On the NYSE, specialists continually identify and trade repeatedly with a relatively small 
community size of brokers (Benveniste et. al (1992)). Benveniste et. al (1992) suggests that 
these brokers develop reputations for representing specific type of orders, enabling the 
specialists to identify the sources and motivations of these brokers. The specialist on the 
NYSE is able to read from his monitor screen certain mnemonics that allow him to identify 
the identity of the broker who submitted SuperDot (Digital Order Turnaround orders) orders. 
Over time, the specialists are able to recognize patterns in trades associated with certain 
mnemonics and, in turn, deduce the trader type behind a submitted order (Sugato (2001)). In 
knowing the trader type, the specialists can then price protect themselves by adjusting the 
spreads and spread sizes (Sugato (2001)) Therefore, to the extent that broker identity serves 
as a valuable source of information, uninformed traders may be able to enjoy lower trading 
costs in the market. This is because, in a market with transparent identities, market makers 
are able to offer lower bid-ask spreads when an uninformed trader is recognized. This in turn 
leads to a fairer and more efficient market, attracting greater order flow to the financial 
exchange. 
In modelling the relationship between transparency and liquidity, several theoretical models 
have been built in the current literature. We shall look at some of the theoretical findings that 
point to the benefits of revealing broker identifiers. Pagano et. al (1996) compares the price 
formation process in various types of auction and dealer markets. In the model, transparency 
is depicted as a situation whereby market makers while setting prices, can observe the size 
and direction of the order flow in real time. Interestingly, the model asserts that it is more 
important for market makers than for end users of the market to be able to access such order 
flow information due to the belief that market makers are better able to determine trading 
costs and liquidity. This is because increased order flow transparency allows market makers 
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to identify if they are trading with informed or liquidity traders. Thus, market makers can 
price protect themselves against informed traders, while offering lower trading costs to 
uninformed markets in a more transparent market (Pagano et. al (1996)). Although Pagano 
et. al (1996) does not discuss disclosure of broker identity as one of the components of pre-
trade information, we continue to adopt the theoretical concept of pre-trade transparency 
discussed in the model to the merits of broker identity transparency. Therefore, to the extent 
that broker identity represents the same value inherent in order flow information, liquidity 
traders shall also find it easier to signal their uninformed trading motives, thus facilitating 
lower adverse selection problem. Thus, owing to the easy identification of trader type, 
liquidity motivated traders (eg: uninformed traders) tend to enjoy prices executed inside the 
quoted spread while traders with private information (eg: informed traders) pay the higher 
quoted spread. Inevitably, a relatively transparent market with lower trading costs will attract 
even more order flow, thus enjoying improved market liquidity. 
Contrary to some popular beliefs, Madhavan (1996) provides a theoretical model to 
demonstrate that thin markets are likely to experience the potentially adverse effects of 
transparency. Although the model does not pertain specifically to pre-trade broker identity 
disclosure, it is relevant as a guidance for this thesis as Madhavan (1996) recognises that 
broker identity on the NYSE provides valuable information. The model begins by affirming 
that increased transparency does allow traders to better estimate the asset’s true value. Also, 
transparency reduces the level of noise in the system as uncertainty regarding the magnitude 
of liquidity trading is eliminated. As a result, in a relatively illiquid market, this reduction in 
noise may cause greater price movements for any order flow shock, thus increasing price 
volatility and price informativeness. This suggests that market transparency will only reduce 
price volatility and increase market liquidity provided the market is sufficiently liquid and 
large and that transparency does not induce market failure. This market failure is said to 
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occur due to the reduced amount of market noise which lowers market liquidity, making 
prices more sensitive to undisclosed liquidity trades. In other words, a transparent market 
may be more suitable for more liquid securities, while an anonymous market may be more 
beneficial for less liquid securities. Madhavan (1996) concludes that “transparency reduces 
price volatility and increases market liquidity if the market is sufficiently large and 
there is sufficient noise trading”. This is because in a sufficiently large and liquid market, 
transparency of order flow information does not alter traders’ strategies, thus leading to more 
stable prices in the market.  
In another theoretical model, Madhavan (1995) highlights that even in a consolidated market, 
trade disclosure should be used as one of the mechanisms to prevent order flow fragmentation. 
The model defines market consolidation as a system whereby dealers have homogeneous 
information and trade disclosure is mandatory, thereby quoting identical prices. These dealers 
may refer to individual dealers in a market or separate financial exchanges. Fragmentation 
refers to a system whereby dealers have heterogeneous beliefs due to voluntary trade 
disclosure, thereby causing prices to differ across trading institutions at a given point in time. 
The model suggests that the lack of mandatory trade disclosure causes market fragmentation 
because dealers will choose not to disclose their trades to profit on future trades from their 
private information on past trades, thereby reducing price competition in the market. As 
less information is impounded into prices, fragmentation also causes higher price volatility 
and lower price efficiency. Madhavan (1995) also depict informed traders as preferring to 
trade in a market with reduced transparency as they are able to conceal their initial trades, 
thereby profiting from the value of their private information through dynamic trading. 
Therefore, these informed traders may benefit at the expense of uninformed traders in a less 
transparent market. Similarly, large traders who require multiple trades to fill their orders 
prefer to trade in an anonymous market to obtain lower expected execution costs. Overall, it 
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is important to consider the emphasis of this theoretical model on its support for mandatory 
trade information disclosure and its implications on liquidity and stock prices.  
Besides these theoretical models, academics have continued to develop empirical findings to 
build a strong foundation for encouraging greater broker identity disclosure. Using trade data 
by the Paris Bourse, Waisburd (2003) investigates the impact of the degree of trader identity 
transparency on the cost of liquidity. Waisburd (2003) highlights that “concealing trader 
identity reduces opportunities for the market to identify the transactions of liquidity providers 
and engage in trading practices that make it more costly to unwind inventory positions”. Thus, 
in the research study, they observe significantly narrower average bid-ask spreads in the 
market where broker identities are widely disseminated which is strongly attributable to the 
reduction in the average inventory control costs. This improvement in liquidity is 
triggered by the greater willingness of liquidity providers to share risk due to the observable 
inventory management trades in the transparent market. Waisburd (2003) concludes that the 
disclosure of broker identities provides information regarding the nature of the order flow 
that he/she represents.  
Theissen (2003) examines the impact of the disclosure of trading identity on price formation 
and liquidity on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. They document that broker identities should 
be disclosed as they convey important information that aid in reducing adverse selection 
risk among traders. They assert that the ability to identify the type of trader in the market 
allows liquidity motivated traders to enjoy price improvements due to lesser information 
asymmetry. As less liquid stocks have higher adverse selection costs, Theissen (2003) 
suggests that as illiquid stocks are most likely to incur higher adverse selection costs, broker 
identities should be disclosed to allow them to trade in an efficient and fair market.  
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In September 2002, Island electronic communications network (ECN) removed the display of 
its automated limit order book for several of its highest-volume exchange-traded funds (ETFs) 
on the ECN. Being the dominant market for these securities, this rule enforcement impacted 
upon the trading environment of these ETFs. Hendershott et. al (2005) conducted an 
empirical test on this natural experiment when Island complies with this regulatory 
enforcement and the later restoration of quotes in October 2003. They find that Island’s 
market share of trading decreased substantially after the decision to go dark. Island’s 
decision to go dark also hampered the ETF prices efficiency in adjusting to new information, 
leading to worsened price discovery. The slower price discovery process is evident both 
within the ETF market and between the ETF and futures market. Prior to Island going dark, 
traders depended on the Island to obtain the efficient price. After Island goes dark, traders 
have to weigh the efficient price in each venue accordingly, thereby complicating the price 
discovery process. In addition, there is an increase in trading costs in the anonymous Island 
and lower trading costs in other markets. The removal of quotes on Island reduces the 
information available to liquidity suppliers. This results in greater information asymmetry 
and lesser aggressive competition among liquidity suppliers on the Island, thereby increasing 
its trading costs. On the other hand, order flow is picked up by other markets, whereby 
liquidity providers are more competitive, thereby providing lower spreads. Correspondingly, 
when quotes were redisplayed, trading costs fell and the price discovery process improved. 
Based on these strong evidences, Hendershott et. al (2005) strongly encourages greater 
transparency in a market to allow customers to obtain the best possible execution.    
Similarly, empirical studies like Boehmer et. al (2005) demonstrates the effects of pre-trade 
transparency by using the natural experiment provided by the OpenBook system introduced 
by the NYSE. This study aims to examine the impact of an increase in pre-trade information 
about the limit order book on trading strategies and its subsequent impact on market liquidity. 
23 
 
Although it does not consider broker identification specifically, we continue to adopt its 
findings in our understanding of the merits of broker identity transparency versus opacity. In 
particular, they find increased market liquidity, better price improvements by the specialists 
and improved price efficiency after the introduction of the OpenBook system. Interestingly, 
the findings also find that limit-order traders alter their trades more frequently and quickly 
under the transparent regime. This behaviour is in consistent with the fact that as all orders 
are publicly disclosed, traders find it attractive to self-mange their trading strategies and 
orders. As traders are no longer strongly reliant on floor brokers, there is a shift of trading 
activity towards submitting electronic limit orders. In accordance with Boehmer et. al (2005), 
this indicates that increased pre-trade transparency accompanied by greater information 
flow in the market allows greater competition between traders, thus bringing market 
liquidity to a higher level. Accompanying the improvement in informational efficiency of 
the OpenBook is a decline in the price impact of trades. Overall, the research strongly 
affirms that greater pre-trade transparency is a determinant of improved market quality.  
Maher et. al (2008) addresses the question of whether a stock exchange should reveal the 
identity of brokers placing limit orders thru the investigation of five natural experiments. 
Euronext Paris and Brussels, the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Australian Stock Exchange 
have all removed broker identification from the limit order book, while the Korea Stock 
Exchange has introduced broker identification. Empirical findings of this study confirm that 
broker identity anonymity results in an increase in effective bid-ask spreads, an increase in 
intraday volatility and a decrease in overall trading volume. In contention with widely held 
belief in the extant literature, the smaller stocks experienced the most significant increases in 
spreads as these more illiquid stocks face the highest information asymmetry when broker 
identities are concealed in a market. 
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Amidst the compelling findings on the advantages of broker identity disclosure, extant 
literature has also documented the disadvantages of pre-trade transparency in such form. In 
one of those empirical studies, Simaan et. al (2003) examines the impact of pre-trade 
anonymity of dealers through observing the quotation behaviour of market makers on the 
Nasdaq. They allude the presence of wider spreads in a transparent market to the existence 
of dealer identity disclosure. It is argued that dealers enforce informal collusive agreement 
among themselves by keeping spreads wide or by refusing to trade with offending dealers. In 
other words, anyone quoting narrower spreads is easily identified and will be “punished” by 
other quote setters. Thus, Simaan et.al (2003) affirms that dealers have a higher propensity to 
post more aggressive and narrower quotes when they can post quotes anonymously. Indeed, 
their findings show that Nasdaq dealer quotes posted through the anonymous electronic 
communication networks are significantly lower than those quotes posted through the 
transparent Nasdaq quotation system. They believe that dealer identity should not be 
disclosed as dealers are encouraged to offer lower trading costs in such a market. In 
contention with their findings, it is suggested that broker identity opacity allows a market 
with narrower spreads and greater price competition. 
In another theoretical study, Foucault et. al (2003) first constructs a theoretical model to show 
how the disclosure of limit order traders’ identity affects market liquidity. Then, they conduct 
an empirical study to test the model prediction. The model consists of both informed and 
uninformed limit order traders who have asymmetric information on the likelihood of an 
information event (i.e. future price changes). As informed traders bid more conservatively 
when an information event is about to occur, the state of the limit order book contains 
information on the probability of the event occurring. Specifically, when the book is thin, 
uninformed traders regard this as a signal that the cost of providing liquidity is high. If so, 
these uninformed traders will not improve upon posted quotes. This induces the informed 
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traders to employ bluffing strategies; if the cost of liquidity provision were small, they bid as 
if the cost of liquidity provision were large. In a similar intuition, Foucault et. al (2003) 
explains when broker identity is disclosed, informed traders gives away information about the 
magnitude of future price movements through their quotation behaviour. Uninformed traders 
make use of this “free” information and set quotes that are more aggressive than those of the 
informed traders. In order to protect themselves against such opportunity cost, the informed 
traders will set wider spreads than necessary in deceiving the uninformed traders. Foucault et. 
al (2003) suggests that in an anonymous market with no traders’ identity revealed, informed 
traders will not engage such bluffing strategies and thus will always post competitive quotes. 
Based on this predicted behaviour, the model provides a theoretical notion that anonymity 
results in narrower bid-ask spreads. In other words, the model asserts that in an 
anonymous market, the informational content of the limit order book declines. With more 
noise in the book, it is predicted that informed traders will be more inclined to post 
aggressive limit orders. In order to test its theoretical propositions, Foucault et. al (2003) 
continues to conduct an empirical test by using the natural experiment on the Euronext Paris 
where broker identifiers are removed. With the focus on the effects on liquidity, they observe 
a decline in the bid ask spread and market depth with broker identity anonymity in the 
market. Further, empirical evidence points to the significant reduction in volatility after the 
removal of broker identifiers on the exchange. Overall, Foucault et. al (2003) concludes that 
broker identity anonymity has an ambiguous effect on liquidity.  
Duong et. al (2008) examines order aggressiveness on the ASX pre and post the removal of 
the broker ID identifiers in November 2005. They conclude that limit order traders are less 
aggressive in an anonymous market, posting limit orders rather than marketable orders. This 
explains the tighter spreads in an anonymous market.  
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Comerton-Forde et. al (2005) extends the analysis of Foucault et. al (2003) and examines the 
impact of broker anonymity on bid-ask spreads in order driven markets using three natural 
experiments provided by Euronext Paris, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) and the Korea 
Stock Exchange (KSE). The Euronext Paris and the TSE has increased their level of 
anonymity whereas the KSE has ceased broker anonymity. Specifically, empirical results 
show a decline in the relative bid-ask spreads and effective spreads of orders in the TSE 
and Euronext Paris. Correspondingly, they find higher trading costs on the KSE. Despite 
some ambiguous results, the paper suggests that overall market liquidity is enhanced by 
increased broker identity anonymity.   
In an experiment, Rindi (2006) shows how the disclosure of traders’ identities influences the 
quality of an open limit order book. Firstly, in Rindi (2006) theoretical framework: traders are 
described as updating their expectations on the liquidation value based on the current price, 
whereas in the transparent regime, traders are able to observe personal identities and use the 
informed traders’ orders to infer the liquidation value of the asset. The model predicts that 
uninformed traders prefer the transparent regime as it provides them with a better signal of 
the liquidation value than the current price. Previously, only the informed traders receive a 
signal on the liquidation value of the asset after paying a cost for it. In the transparent regime, 
uniformed traders become somewhat “informed” and are faced with lower adverse selection 
costs, thus willing to provide greater liquidity. Thus, it is suggested that transparency 
reduces the incentive for informed traders to acquire the costly signal because the 
uninformed traders will free ride on this information. The model concludes that informed 
traders, being the best liquidity providers, will be more willing to provide liquidity in an 
anonymous market. Despite the model’s argument against transparency, it recognizes that 
transparency allows greater informational efficiency as the asset’s liquidation value is known 
with more precision. In addition, due to the reduced participation by informed traders in the 
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market, transparency is accompanied with lower market volatility. Secondly, through an 
experiment, a transparent market whereby traders’ identities are displayed is compared to an 
anonymous structure.  They find that in the transparency market, informed traders are less 
willing to purchase information to receive a signal on the asset’s liquidation value. Also, in 
the transparent structure, liquidity and volatility is significantly reduced. Overall, Rindi (2006) 
writes that if acquisition of information is costly, traders’ identities should be concealed to 
preserve the number of informed traders as they are the best liquidity providers.   
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3   INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 
The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) is one of the world’s top 10 listed exchange groups, 
represented by its large market capitalization. The ASX group is formed through the merger 
between the Australian Stock Exchange and the Sydney Futures Exchange. The ASX uses the 
fully computerized order-driven system of trading, which is known as Stock Exchange 
Automated Trading System (SEATS).  
The ASX operates a pure limit order book, which is open to all market participants. There are 
no market makers in ASX so that the public orders interact without any intervention from 
liquidity suppliers. The SEATS Trading Screen allows users to observe the buy and sell 
orders along the limit order book. Aggregate depth at multiple price levels can also be viewed 
in real time. Representative brokers and institutional investors get more insights on the order 
book details, while online trades get an aggregate view of the limit order book (Cao et. al 
2004).   
ASX goes through a number of market phases in any trading day. During the pre-opening 
hours from 7:00AM to 10:00AM (Sydney Time), only orders can be entered into the trading 
system. In the opening phase at 10:00AM, opening prices are calculated. Securities then open 
according to the alphabetical order in their ASX code. Normal Trading occurs between 
10:00AM to 4:00PM. Brokers continually enter orders into the trading system. The trading 
system matches all trades based on the Price/Time Priority rule.  At 4:00PM, the market is 
placed in a pre-open period, which prepares for the closing of the market. A Closing Single 
Price Auction occurs from 4:10PM to 4:12PM, whereby closing prices are calculated. 1 
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4   HYPOTHESES 
In the literature review, we discuss in detail both the theoretical and empirical findings 
pointing to the issue of broker identity transparency versus opacity. We continue to adopt the 
extant literature in building the hypotheses in this section.  
From a practitioner’s view, there is a widespread belief that mandatory disclosure of 
information about broker identities improves overall market quality. This argument is based 
on the explanation that anonymity will make it harder for brokers to find counterparties for 
their trades. Therefore, trades which are represented by different brokers should be adversely 
affected by less information about the identity of potential counterparties. On the contrary, 
trades which are represented by the same brokers (LOB,SBrok and SpCross) should 
experience minimal impact by the removal of broker identifiers. This suggests the first 
hypothesis that there will be a shift for preference of trades that are represented by the 
crossed and internalized trades and special crossings.  
Hypothesis 1: To the extent that brokers, and implicitly, their customers value broker 
identifier disclosure, there will be an increase in preference for crossed and internalized 
trades in the limit order book and in the special crossings trades in the anonymous regime.   
When market makers are able to identify the type of traders in the market, they have a greater 
incentive to offer lower trading costs to uninformed traders (Pagano et.al (1996)). Analogous 
to the theoretical model of Pagano et. al (1996), liquidity traders are able to enjoy better price 
improvements when broker identifiers are disclosed. The ability of traders to identify the 
trade source reduces adverse selection risk and search costs in the market, thereby reducing 
transaction costs for the uninformed traders (Theissen (2003)). Informational efficiency is 
thus increasing in pre-trade transparency, and consequently, transaction costs will be 
decreasing in pre-trade transparency (Boehmer et. al  (2005)).  
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Hypothesis 2: In the anonymous market with the removal of broker identifiers, the market’s 
overall transaction costs as measured by the bid-ask spreads are higher. In addition, it is 
expected that the limit order book will exhibit an increase in transaction costs in the 
anonymous regime.  
 Madhavan (1996) asserts that transparency reduces the level of noise in the system, allowing 
better estimation of the stock’s true value. Thus, a transparent market is characterized as 
having lower volatility due to the decreased price movements. However, Madhavan (1996) 
shows that increased transparency may benefit only sufficiently large markets. It is possible 
that the anonymous market after the removal of broker identifiers may in fact only benefit 
small or mid-sized firms. Therefore, adopting the proposition of  Madhavan (1996) , we 
formulate our third hypothesis on the volatility of the ASX after the removal of broker 
identifiers.   
Hypothesis 3: The anonymous market with the removal of broker identifiers increases the 
volatility of security prices for all trades on the ASX. This higher volatility should be more 
pronounced for the most liquid or large stocks and less existent for the most liquid or smaller 
stock that are traded in the anonymous regime.  
To the extent that broker identifiers contain valuable information, the loss of broker 
identifiers will increase information asymmetry in the market, especially for trades that are 
represented by different broker-dealer firms. Therefore, limit order traders will post less 
aggressive orders (Hendershott et. al (2005)). If limit order traders do post less aggressive 
orders which is also evident in Duong et. al (2008), trade executions will be affected 
negatively as there is less trading in the anonymous market.  
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Hypothesis 4: Overall traded value in the anonymous market is lower, when other factors 
affecting traded value are kept constant. The limit order book will exhibit lower traded value 
in the opaque regime.  
In fulfilling the second objective of the thesis, we are interested to know if the crossed and 
internalized trades exert a negative externality on the limit order book and the overall market. 
If this negative externality is present, the market quality of the overall market and the limit 
order trades represent by different brokers will decline in comparison to the crossed and 
internalized trades and special crossings.  
Hypothesis 5: The shift of liquidity to the crossed and internalized trades and special 
crossings will exert a higher negative externality on the overall market and the limit order 
book in the anonymous regime.  
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5   DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1   DATA 
For the purpose of this thesis, data is obtained from the Securities Industry Research Centre 
of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) with the permission of the source, the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX). Dates and times of each intraday trade pertaining to the 300 largest stocks included in 
the Standards and Poor’s ASX 300 index are obtained. The final number of included stocks is 
298. This data is time-stamped to the nearest second and covers the period from 1 September 
2005 to 29 September 2006. The data contains observations on every trade, including 
intraday trade prices, opening and closing prices, volume information and best bid and ask 
quotes for the sample stocks. The S&P/ASX 300 includes the S&P/ASX 200 stocks as well 
as a maximum of 100 smaller stocks. The S&P/ASX 300 stocks are examined as they are 
sufficiently liquid and represent a relatively significant market capitalization on the 
Australian equity market. The data also provides an indicator of whether the broker dealer 
firm is different or the same between each buyer and seller. In addition, it also contains an 
indicator for special crossings and cross trades. The sample includes all seasoned common 
stocks in the ASX 300. REITS (i.e. Real Estate Investment Trusts), preferred shares and IPOs 
(i.e. Initial Public Offerings) under lockup provision are not included in the data sample. All 
intra-day based measures will be aggregated to a daily level time series data. 
In addition, the DataStream Database is used to acquire data for the market capitalisation of 
the stocks in the ASX 300. This data is required to rank the sample stocks according to their 
market capitalization to categorize them into quintiles 1 to 5. Specifically, Quintile 1consists 
of firms with the smallest market capitalization and Quintile 5 refers to firms with the largest 
market capitalization.  
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5.2   RESEARCH DESIGN 
We aim to determine if the removal of broker identifiers is more appropriate for shares 
typically traded on the ASX. If the new trading protocol is more appropriate, the market 
quality measures for the market should not deteriorate significantly. In addition, the crossed 
and internalized trades and large special crossings will exhibit better market quality.   
5.2.1   Event Window 
In this thesis, a traditional event study methodology is used to investigate the impact of the 
removal of broker identifiers on the ASX. Thereby, the removal of broker identifiers on the 
ASX on the 28 November, 2005 is the event of interest. Data pertaining to all stocks is 
divided into two parts, namely pre-event and post-event. Pre-event refers to the trading period 
before the removal of broker identifiers and post-event refers to the trading period after the 
event. Analysis of variables is done on a 3 months period around the event date. Pre-event  
(i.e. inclusive of months September 2005 to November 2005) covers 3 months prior to the 
event date and post-event 1 (i.e. inclusive of months December 2005 to February 2006) 
covers 3 months immediately after the event date. In contention with Goldstein et. al (2000), 
additional analysis is done to allow for a period of learning following the event date and to 
provide robustness tests. As market participants may alter their strategies slowly in response 
to the anonymity of broker identifiers, we also examine over another second 3 months post-
period,  post-event 2 (i.e. inclusive of months March 2006 to May 2006), and a third 3 
months post-period,  post-event 3 (i.e. inclusive of months June 2006 to August 2006). The 
variables of interest will be compared against the pre-event period for each of the respective 
post-event periods.  
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5.2.2   Variables of interest 
The main focus of this thesis is to determine the impact of the removal of broker identifiers 
on the market quality of the ASX and the specific trade types. As this is not directly 
observable, various proxies have to be introduced to facilitate the investigation. The quality 
of a market is generally measured by proxy variables like liquidity, volatility and trading 
activity. The effective spread, which is a measure of implicit transaction costs, has been a 
popular proxy for liquidity (Ahn et. al (1999)). Thus, the three main proxies or variables to be 
used for this study are effective spread, intraday volatility and traded value.  
The effective bid-ask spread is considered to be the most relevant measure for transaction 
costs as it allows measurement of trades that are not executed at the posted bid and ask quotes. 
It measures the closeness of the trade price to the quotation midpoint, which is twice the 
absolute value of the difference between the executed price and the midpoint of the best bid 
and ask quote. The effective spread for stock i at time t is defined as:  
Effective spreadi,t =     2 * ABS{ Trade Pricei,t – ((Askit + Bidi,t)/2) }                  (1)                 
In the equation: Trade Pricei,t is the transaction price at time t for stock i, Askit is the best ask 
price in the limit order book at time t for stock i, Bidi,t is the best bid price in the limit order 
book at time t for stock i, and (Aski,t + Bidi,t)/2) is the midpoint of the respective trade’s bid 
and ask quotes at time t for stock i. Thus, we shall utilise equation (1) to measure the 
difference between the trade price and the mid-point between the best bid and ask quote in 
the limit order book for every trade that occurs during the day, yielding the effective spread.  
Volatility is the tendency for stock prices to move unexpectedly. Frequent and sharp price 
movements cause prices to be less informative and can seriously affect the confidence of 
investors. According to Harris (2003), there is a strong association between volatility and risk. 
In general, risk averse investors avoid trading in a market exhibiting large price movements. 
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Thus, it is necessary for this thesis to examine volatility as a proxy for the impact of broker 
anonymity on the ASX as this proxy is a determinant of the market’s order flow. To date, 
various models have been built to measure volatility as it is not directly measurable. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the range-based intraday volatility is utilised to measure the impact of 
the event on the stocks’ daily price range. This is derived by the log of the daily highest price 
minus the log of the daily lowest price as shown by the following formulae:  
Intraday Volatility = log (highest price) – log (lowest price)                  (2) 
The usefulness of this formula, the log range, has been concluded by Alizadeh et. al (2002) to 
be a robust measure of volatility and much less noisier than alternative volatility measures. 
Intraday volatility is observed for every trade occurring in the day in inferring the riskiness of 
the market after the removal of broker anonymity.  
Traded value is used as a variable in determining trading activity on the ASX. This is 
observed for every trade occurring in the day by multiplying the trade price with the volume 
traded: 
Traded Value = (Trade Price)*(Volume)                                                            (3) 
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5.2.3   Univariate Analysis 
We compare the mean effective spreads, traded values and volatility for the transparent and 
anonymous trading regimes. Descriptive statistics for these three variables will be compared 
for the whole sample and by trade types too. The former allows us to infer market quality for 
the whole market in the anonymous regime and the latter enables us to infer how the market 
quality has changed among different types of trades after the market reform. In examining the 
trade types by quintiles, the sample stocks will be ranked according to their market 
capitalization, ranging from Quintile 1 (i.e. stocks with smallest market capitalization) to 
Quintile 5 (i.e. stocks with largest market capitalization). As stocks of different market 
capitalization exhibit different characteristics, comparison by quintiles shall produce unbiased 
results. In addition, within each quintile, trades will be further segmented into LOB,SBrok, 
LOB,DBrok and SpCross. This will show distinctly the difference in the market quality 
measures of different types of trades in their respective quintiles during the pre- and post-
event periods.   
A univariate analysis will be conducted to test if there is a statistical significance of 
difference on the key market quality variables in the respective pre- and post-event periods. 
Specifically: As outlined earlier, the 3 months pre-event shall serve as a benchmark. Then, 
each of the Post-event 1, Post-event 2 and Post-event 3 will be compared to this benchmark 
for any differences in the variables. The statistical significance of the difference in means 
between the benchmark period and each of the post-event periods is tested for each of the 
variables of interest using the t-test. The t-test is a parametric test used to estimate the 
significance of the difference in the means relative to their respective spread or variability.  
As a robustness check, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, which is a non-parametric test, is 
also used to test for the significance of difference in means of the variables as it does not 
require the dependent variable to be normally distributed (Chandra et. al (1991)). In all three 
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event windows, we report the t-statistic and the p-value for the t-test and the Wilcoxon two-
sample test respectively. These are tested at the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%.  
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5.2.4   Multivariate Analysis 
Despite the power of the univariate analysis to examine potential pre and post movements in 
market quality, it fails to control for other external factors that might affect the proxy 
variables. Therefore, a multivariate analysis has to be conducted to discern the exact impact 
of the removal of broker identifiers on the key market quality measures. This analysis will 
aim to model the sole impact of the removal of broker identifiers, while controlling for other 
factors that may affect the proxy variable that are unrelated to the event of study. In doing so, 
we will apply and extend models that have been used in the extant literature. All variables 
used in the regression models are calculated on an average daily basis for each stock.   
5.2.4.1    The Empirical Model for Traded Value 
In order to model the impact of broker anonymity on the market’s traded value, we adopt the 
regression model from Maher et. al (2008):  
TVali,t = α0 + β1TVali,t-1 + β2ESpi,t + β3Voli,t + β4 ln MCapi,t + β5BIdDumi,t + εi,t,      (1a) 
where  TVali,t is the daily traded value for stock i in trading period t and TVali,t-1 is its first 
lagged value. ESpi,t is the effective spread, Voli,t is the standard deviation of daily return and 
lnMCapi is the natural log of the stock’s market capitalization. BIdDumi,t is a dummy 
variable that is assigned 1 if in the post-event period and 0 if in the pre-event period. The size 
and significance level of the dummy variable BIdDumi,t will be observed. Specifically, if the 
coefficient of the dummy variable is significantly and negatively signed, it suggests that 
anonymity has lead to an overall decrease in traded value.   
The OLS estimator assumes that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals. The inclusion of 
lagged dependent variables in the model has been proposed as a useful solution to account for 
the presence of any autocorrelation. In addition, the addition of lagged dependent variables in 
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the regression allows any dynamic effects to be captured (Keele et. al (2006)). Thus, we 
include up to four lagged dependent variables of the traded value in equation (2a):  
TVali,t = α0 + β1TVali,t-1 + β2TVali,t-2 + β3TVali,t-3 +β4TVali,t-4 + β5ESpi,t + β6Voli,t +  
               β7 ln MCapi,t + β8BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                                (2a) 
All variables are as previously defined.  
Next, the dependent variable in equation (1a) is then replaced with the daily average traded 
value for the subsample of trades represented by different brokers in the limit order book (i.e. 
LOB,DBrok trades). The aim is to measure the significance of the changes in the association 
between crossed and internalised trading and the traded value for the limit order trades 
represented by different brokers. The modified regression is seen in equation (3a). Then, we 
continue to add lagged dependent variables in equation (4a).  
TVali,LOB,t = α0 + β1TVali,LOB,t-1 + β2ESpi,t + β3Voli,t + β4 ln MCapi,t + β5BIdDumi,t  
                   + εi,t,                                                                                                           (3a) 
TVali,LOB,t = α0 + β1TVali,LOB,t-1 + β2TVali,LOB,t-2 + β3TVali,LOB,t-3 + β4TVali,LOB,t-4 + β5ESpi,t +  
                   β6Voli,t + β7ln MCapi,t + β8BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                              (4a)                                   
Equation (1a) to (4a) will be analysed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the fixed 
effects regression analysis. OLS regression is the most commonly used method in ordinary 
linear regression. It utilizes the least squares method to find the regression parameters. The 
fixed effects regression allows us to exploit the panel data to control for the difference in the 
stocks’ characteristics.  
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On the other hand, it can be argued that the market quality measures might have been 
affected by changes in trend over time. To account for this, we create a daily trend variable 
for each stock in the sample. We then include this trend i,t variable as seen in equation (5a). 
This allows us to measure the exact impact of the removal of broker identifiers on effective 
spreads, while controlling for the independent variables plus the trend variable. 
TVali,t = α0 + β1TVali,t-1 + β2ESpi,t + β3Voli,t + β4 ln MCapi,t + β5trendi,t +β6BIdDumi,t  
              + εi,t,           (5a)      
As a robustness check, we continue to add lagged dependent variables for the equation which 
controls for the effect of trend on the market’s traded value: 
TVali,t = α0 + β1TVali,t-1 + β2TVali,t-2 + β3TVali,t-3 +β4TVali,t-4 + β5ESpi,t + β6Voli,t +  
               β7 ln MCapi,t + β8trendi,t + β9BIdDumi,t + εi,t,              (6a)                                    
We are also interested to know the association between the market share of LOB,DBrok 
trades and the respective market quality measures. This allows us to measure the effects of 
the same broker trades and to facilitate our discussion for hypothesis 5.  
Thus, we include the market share of LOB,DBrok, which is derived by: 
LOBDBrokmktshare= LOBDBrok total traded value / total traded value for all trades  
This is measured on a daily basis and is included in equation (7a) to analyse the relation 
between the market share of LOB,DBrok trades and traded value of the market. If there is a 
negative association between these two variables, we will confirm that the crossed and 
internalized trades are said to create a negative externality on the overall market as they 
attract order flow away from the LOB,DBrok trades.  
 
41 
 
TVali,t = α0 + β1TVali,t-1 + β2ESpi,t + β3Voli,t + β4 ln MCapi,t + β5LOBDBrokmktshare   
             +β6BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                                                            (7a) 
Next, we add lags in equation (8a), with the dependent variable as the traded value for all 
trades. The addition of lags allow us to control for the presence of autocorrelation while 
facilitating the provision of the robust test:  
TVali,t = α0 + β1TVali,t-1 + β2TVali,t-2 + β3TVali,t-3 +β4TVali,t-4 + β5ESpi,t + β6Voli,t +  
               β7 ln MCapi,t + β8LOBDBrokmktshare  + β9BIdDumi,t + εi,t,            (8a)                
We are also interested to know how the change in the market share of the LOB,DBrok trades 
affects the traded value of all LOB,DBrok trades. This is done by replacing the dependent 
variable as seen in the following equation (9a). Then, in equation (10a), we add lags of the 
dependent variable for traded value of all LOB,DBrok trades 
  TVali,LOB,t = α0 + β1TVali,LOB,t-1 + β2ESpi,t + β3Voli,t + β4 ln MCapi,t + β5LOBDBrokmktshare   
                      + β6BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                                 (9a)                                    
TVali,LOB,t = α0 + β1TVali,LOB,t-1 + β2TVali,LOB,t-2 + β3TVali,LOB,t-3 + β4TVali,LOB,t-4 + β5ESpi,t +  
                   β6Voli,t + β7ln MCapi,t + β8LOBDBrokmktshare  + β9BIdDumi,t + εi,t,   (10a)                                  
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5.2.4.2    The Empirical Model for Transaction Costs 
We adopt the model of Madhavan et. al (2005) to analyse the effective spreads of the market. 
ESpi,t = α0 + β1 ESpi,t-1 + β2Voli,t + β3TVali,t + β4 ln MCapi,t + β5BIdDumi,t + εi,t,            (1b) 
Where ESpi,t is the effective spread and ESpi,t-1 is its first lagged value. Again, BIdDumi,t is a 
dummy variable that is assigned 1 if in the post-event period and 0 if in the pre-event period.  
To account for the presence of autocorrelation, we continue to include up to four lagged 
values for effective spreads in equation (2b):  
ESpi,t = α0 + β1 ESpi,t-1 + β2 ESpi,t-2 + β3 ESpi,t-3+ β4 ESpi,t-4 +β5Voli,t + β6TVali,t + β7 ln MCapi,t    
            + β8BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                                                                                                              (2b) 
All variables are as previously defined.  
Next, the dependent variable in equation (1b) is then replaced with the daily average effective 
spread for the subsample of trades between different brokers in the limit order book (i.e. 
LOB,DBrok trades). The modified regression is seen in equation (3b). Then, we continue to 
add lagged dependent variables in equation (4b).  
ESpi,LOB,t = α0 + β1 ESpi,LOB,t-1 + β2Voli,t + β3TVali,t + β4 ln MCapi,t + β5BIdDumi,t + εi,t,  (3b) 
ESpi,LOB,t = α0 + β1 ESpi,LOB,t-1 + β2 ESpi,LOB,t-2 + β3 ESpi,LOB,t-3+ β4 ESpi,LOB,t-4 +β5Voli,t +         
                   β6TVali,t + β7 ln MCapi,t + β8BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                              (4b) 
Equation (1b) to (4b) will be analysed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the fixed 
effects regression analysis.  
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To account for the effects of the change in trend for effective spreads, we create a daily trend 
variable for each stock in the sample. We then include this trend i,t variable as seen in 
equation (5b). This allows us to measure the exact impact of the removal of broker identifiers 
on effective spreads, while controlling for the independent variables plus the trend variable: 
ESpi,t = α0 + β1 ESpi,t-1 + β2Voli,t + β3TVali,t + β4 ln MCapi,t + β5trend i,t  
            + β6BIdDumi,t +εi,t,                                                                                                                  (5b)                                      
We continue to add lagged dependent variables for the equation which controls for the effects 
of trend on the market’s effective spread: 
ESpi,t = α0 + β1 ESpi,t-1 + β2 ESpi,t-2 + β3 ESpi,t-3+ β4 ESpi,t-4 +β5Voli,t + β6TVali,t + β7 ln MCapi,t    
            + β8trendi,t + β9BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                                     (6b)                
Next, equation (7b) allows us to analyse the relation between the market share of LOB,DBrok 
trades and effective spreads of the market. If there is a positive association between these two 
variables, we will confirm that an increased market share of the crossed and internalized 
trades creates a negative externality on the overall market.  
ESpi,t = α0 + β1 ESpi,t-1 + β2Voli,t + β3TVali,t + β4 ln MCapi,t + β5LOBDBrokmktshare + 
             β6BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                                   (7b)                
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Next, we add lags in equation (8b), with the dependent variable as effective spreads for all 
trades. Similarly, (8b) allows us to measure the association between the market share of 
LOB,DBrok with the effective spreads for all trades:  
ESpi,t = α0 + β1 ESpi,t-1 + β2 ESpi,t-2 + β3 ESpi,t-3+ β4 ESpi,t-4 +β5Voli,t + β6TVali,t + β7 ln MCapi,t    
            + β8LOBDBrokmktshare + β9BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                    (8b)                                                     
Next, we replace the dependent variable as seen in the following equation (9b). In here, we 
can measure how the change in the market share of LOB,DBrok affects the effective spreads 
of all LOB,DBrok trades. Then, in equation (10b), we add lags of the dependent variable for 
effective spreads of all LOB,DBrok trades: 
 ESpi,LOB,t = α0 + β1 ESpi,LOB,t-1 + β2Voli,t + β3TVali,t + β4 ln MCapi,t + β5LOBDBrokmktshare  
                   + β6BIdDumi,t + εi,t,             (9b) 
ESpi,LOB,t = α0 + β1 ESpi,LOB,t-1 + β2 ESpi,LOB,t-2 + β3 ESpi,LOB,t-3+ β4 ESpi,LOB,t-4 +β5Voli,t +         
                   β6TVali,t + β7 ln MCapi,t + β8LOBDBrokmktshare  + β9BIdDumi,t + εi,t, (10b)                                           
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5.2.4.3    The Empirical Model for Intraday Volatility 
We adopt the model of Madhavan et. al (2005) to determine the impact of the removal of 
broker identifiers on intraday volatility. Madhavan’s model depicts a positive relationship 
between price volatility and trading frequency, which is also widely supported in the current 
literature. The regression model to be used is:  
Voli,t = α0 + β1 Voli,t-1 + β2num_tradesi,t + β3 ln MCapi,t + β4 BIdDumi,t + εi,t,               (1c)                              
where Voli,t is the volatility for stock returns for stock i on trading day t and Voli,t-1 is its first 
lagged value. num_tradesi,t is the average number of trades for stock i over the trading day t. 
All other variables are as previously described. 
Next, we add up to four lags of the dependent variable, volatility in equation (2c).   
Voli,t = α0 + β1Voli,t-1 + β2Voli,t-2 + β3Voli,t-3 +  β4Voli,t-4 + β5num_tradesi,t + β6 ln MCapi,t +  
            β7 BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                                                                (2c)                               
In order to measure the impact of the removal of broker identifiers on the trades represented 
by different brokers, we replace the dependent variable with the daily average volatility for 
LOB,DBrok trades as follow: 
Voli,LOB,t = α0 + β1 Voli,LOB,t-1 + β2num_tradesi,t + β3 ln MCapi,t  + β4 BIdDumi,t + εi,t, (3c)                                 
Next, we add up to four lags of the volatility variable in equation (4c): 
Voli,LOB,t = α0 + β1Voli,LOB,t-1 + β2Voli,LOB,t-2 + β3Voli,LOB,t-3 +  β4Voli,LOB,t-4 + β5num_tradesi,t +  
                 β6 ln MCapi,t + β7 BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                    (4c)       
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Equation (1c) to (4c) shall be analysed through the methodology of Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and the fixed effects regression. 
Next, in equation (5c), we control for the effects of trend on the volatility of the market to 
measure the exact impact of the removal of broker identifiers on market volatility.                                           
Voli,t =  α0 + β1 Voli,t-1 +β2num_tradesi,t + β3 ln MCapi,t + β4trend i,t +β5 BIdDumi,t + εi,t   (5c)      
To account for the presence of autocorrelation, up to four lagged values of volatility are 
added in the modified equation (6c):  
Voli,t = α0 + β1Voli,t-1 + β2Voli,t-2 + β3Voli,t-3 +  β4Voli,t-4 + β5num_tradesi,t + β6 ln MCapi,t +  
           β7trend i,t +β8 BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                                                 (6c)                             
We then continue to measure the association between the market share of LOB,DBrok trades 
on the volatility of the market in equation (7c). If there is a negative association between 
these two variables, we will assert that crossed and internalised trades have created a negative 
externality on the market. In other words, the larger market share of crossed and internalised 
trades serve to increase market volatility.  
Voli,t =  α0 + β1 Voli,t-1 +β2num_tradesi,t + β3 ln MCapi,t +  β4LOBDBrokmktshare + 
            β5 BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                                                                  (7c)                             
 Next, we add lags in the modified equation (8c), with the dependent variable as volatility for 
all trades.  
Voli,t = α0 + β1Voli,t-1 + β2Voli,t-2 + β3Voli,t-3 +  β4Voli,t-4 + β5num_tradesi,t + β6 ln MCapi,t +  
           β7LOBDBrokmktshare + β8 BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                         (8c)    
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The following equation (9c) allows us to measure how the change in the market share of 
LOB,DBrok affects volatility of all LOB,DBrok trades. 
Voli,LOB,t = α0 + β1 Voli,LOB,t-1 + β2num_tradesi,t + β3 ln MCapi,t  +   β4LOBDBrokmktshare   
                  + β5 BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                                                                                         (9c)     
Finally, we add up to four lagged values of the dependent variable:  
Voli,LOB,t = α0 + β1Voli,LOB,t-1 + β2Voli,LOB,t-2 + β3Voli,LOB,t-3 +  β4Voli,LOB,t-4 + β5num_tradesi,t +  
                 β6 ln MCapi,t + β7LOBDBrokmktshare  + β8 BIdDumi,t + εi,t,                  (10c) 
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6   RESULTS 
6.1   UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Descriptive statistics for traded value is shown in tables 4 to 12. After the removal of broker 
identifiers, we observe that overall traded value for the market is lower by 17% in post-event 
1 and with the greatest reduction of 34.08% in traded value in post-event 3. Lower traded 
value of the market is attributable solely to the decreased traded value among the limit order 
trades, which is statistically significant at a 1% level. As the limit order trades exhibit the 
greatest reduction in traded value in post-event 3, it demonstrates that the loss in traded value 
has not been picked up even after a prolonged period after the market reform. Specifically, 
traded value for LOB,DBrok trades continues to decrease at a rate of 4.53% in post-event 1 to 
16.86% in post-event 3. For LOB,SBrok trades, traded value is lower by 15.46% in post-
event 1and lower by 23.75% in post-event 3. On the other hand, traded value for SpCross 
trades increases at a slight 3% shortly after the removal of broker identifiers and increases 
further of up to 14.1% in post-event 2. In post-event 3, the traded value for SpCross trades 
increases by 6.53% as compared to the pre-event period.  
Overall, the univariate results show that we obtain valid support for hypothesis 4 that traders 
do submit lesser limit order trades and the overall market’s traded value is lower in the 
anonymous regime. Also, results suggest that the absence of broker identifiers cause traded 
value in the LOB,SBrok trades to decrease more than LOB,DBrok trades. All in all, this 
justifies that the limit order book does not benefit from the removal of broker identifiers. The 
migration of liquidity to SpCross trades in all investigated periods shows that larger stocks do 
prefer and benefit from a more transparent market, which is in contention with Madhavan 
(1996). As broker identities are automatically restored in SpCross trades, this suggests that 
the observed increase in traded value for SpCross trades demonstrates that there is value in 
broker identification for these trades. Previously, we hypothesize that there will be a shift of 
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liquidity to all trades represented by the same brokers. Although on-market crossed and 
internalized trades exhibit a lower traded value in the anonymous regime, we manage to 
obtain an increase in traded value for the off-market special crossings in all investigated 
periods. Thus, this shows sustainability of hypothesis 1 that there is a shift of liquidity to the 
large special crossings. In addition, we obtain an interesting finding here: the shift of liquidity 
to the large special crossings signals that the market reform enables the large and informed 
trades to enjoy greater liquidity. On one hand, this higher traded value for SpCross trades can 
be seen as aiding in the discovery of additional liquidity for ASX. On the other hand, to the 
extent that liquidity continues to shift off-market, this phenomenon will attract order flow 
away from the on-market trades due to the greater liquidity available off-market. 
Consequently, the SpCross trades will be seen as exerting the first form of negative 
externality on the on-market trades. In addition, the change in trading reform will be 
characterized as a mechanism that allows the large and informed trades to exploit their 
informational advantage off-market at the expense of the market quality of the on-market 
trades, which forms a second type of negative externality. Thus, it is up to the discretion of 
ASX to weigh the benefits against the negative externalities offered by the special crossings 
as a result of the market reform.  
When we specifically examine the change in traded value within quintiles for LOB,DBrok 
trades, we observe that the largest stocks always experience a statistically significant decrease 
in traded value for all post-event periods. Accordingly, we assert that the decrease in traded 
value for LOB,DBrok trades is consistently attributable to all but the smallest stocks, which is 
evident in post-event 1 and 3. For LOB,SBrok trades, the largest decline in traded value is 
always represented by the mid-size and the largest stocks. Further, the smallest stocks (i.e. 
quintile 1) always experience an increase in traded value. In other words, we can say that the 
decline in traded value for LOB,SBrok trades is mainly attributable to the larger stocks. In 
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summary, we confirm hypothesis 4 that traded value in the limit order book is lower in the 
anonymous regime and that this is mostly attributable to all, except the smallest stocks. The 
univariate results allow us to confirm that the anonymous market has some advantages for the 
limit order book, particularly for the smaller stocks. Specific to SpCross trades, we observe 
that in all post-event periods, the increase in traded value is seen in quintiles 2 to 5, except for 
quintile 1. Such results provide additional evidence that larger and informed trades enjoy 
greater liquidity off-market after the market reform. Hence, this shows further support that 
the SpCross trades, especially the larger ones, can free-ride on the trading protocol to exploit 
their informational advantage. 
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Descriptive statistics for effective spreads is presented in tables 13 to 21. Immediately after 
the removal of broker identifiers on the ASX, it is observed that in post-event 1, the limit 
order book experiences a statistically significant increase in effective spreads. Specifically, 
effective spreads in LOB,DBrok trades increase by 26.86% and LOB,SBrok rise by 249.2%. 
However, in post-event 3, the increase in these effective spreads is lower: effective spreads 
for LOB,DBrok trades experience an increase of 10.16% and spreads of the LOB,SBrok 
trades increased by 14.43%. On the other hand, in all post-event periods, effective spreads for 
SpCross trades progressively decreased from 47.42% in post-event 1 to 65.28% in post-event 
3. Compared to the pre-event period, overall effective spreads for the market increase by 
228.64% and 46.67% in post-event 1 and 2 respectively and finally a decrease of 40.69% in 
post-event 3. We assert that an increase in the overall market’s effective spreads is evident 
after the change in trading protocol but is alleviated three to four months later and new 
records has been set since then.  
For each post-event period, the largest increase in effective spreads among LOB,DBrok 
trades are always found in the larger stocks (i.e. quintiles 3 to 5), which is significant at a 1% 
level. This points out that the market reform is the least beneficial for the larger stocks in the 
limit order trades represented by different brokers. Unfortunately, we are unable to find any 
consistent patterns between the quintiles for LOB,SBrok trades. Interestingly, we observe that 
among the SpCross trades, the largest sized stocks (i.e. quintile 5) exhibit consistent and 
statistically significant decrease in effective spreads from 17.82% in post-event 1 to a huge 
62.76% in post-event 3. This may be because the ability to identify brokers off-market 
facilitates the reduction in search costs due to the ability to identify brokers for these large 
crossed trades. On the outset, the largest stocks already face lower informational asymmetry. 
Thus, this lower adverse selection risk augmented with the lower search costs off-market aids 
in the total reduction in the effective spreads for SpCross largest trades (quintile 5). The 
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consistent decrease in the larger SpCross trades is in contention with Madhavan (1996) that 
larger stocks benefit from a more transparent market. To sum up, the univariate results shows 
that there is support for hypothesis 2 that the transaction costs for the limit order book and the 
overall market increases significantly in the anonymous regime. Also, when compared to the 
pre-event period, the smallest stocks for LOB,DBrok trades consistently exhibit reduced 
effective spreads in post-event 1 and 2. Thus, such results points to the possibility that the 
smaller stocks for LOB,DBrok trades benefits from the anonymous market. As overall 
SpCross trades exhibit consistent decrease in effective spreads in all investigated periods, it 
suggests that the removal of broker identifiers allows large and informed trades to occur off-
market at a lower cost. In accordance with hypothesis 1, we argue that it is because broker 
identifiers are automatically restored in these SpCross trades, thus reducing its search costs. 
Consequently, this explains the strong reduction in the effective spreads for the large special 
crossings in the anonymous regime. On one hand, we can say that these SpCross trades can 
aid in attracting order flow among large trades due to its lower transaction costs. On the other 
hand, it is noted that in our hypothesis, we assert that all crossed and internalized trades will 
be less affected or even exhibit higher liquidity by the change in the market reform. However, 
now we find that only the large crossed trades demonstrate a reduction in effective spreads. 
This interesting finding signals that the market reform may be a mechanism that enables the 
large and informed crossed trades to exploit their informational advantage. Thus, to the extent 
that liquidity continues to shift off-market (especially for larger stocks) due to its 
attractiveness of lower transactional costs, there will be a decline in liquidity for all on-
market trades. This causes transactional costs for on-market trades to increase due to a lack of 
liquidity. This phenomena is signalled in the univariate results where we observe a persistent 
increase in the effective spreads in the limit order book in the anonymous regime. If so, the 
53 
 
increased market share of SpCross trades will be characterized as creating a higher negative 
externality in the anonymous market for on-market trades.   
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Descriptive statistics for volatility is shown in tables 22 to 30. Consistent with hypothesis 3, 
after the removal of broker identifiers, volatility for the market is higher at a 1% significant 
level. Specifically, average volatility of the overall market increases from 6% in post-event 1 
to 11% in post-event 2 and peaking at an average of 19% in post-event 3. Such behaviour 
suggests that as the time period after the removal of broker identifiers gets wider, the market 
becomes more susceptible to volatility. In post-event 1 and 2, we continually observe that the 
SpCross trades show the highest increase in volatility, followed by the LOB,DBrok trades. 
However, it is also worth noting that in all investigated periods, the different types of trades 
do not actually show much discrepancy in their volatility values. Overall, we confirm 
hypothesis 3 in that volatility has increased for all trades in the market. Also, in reporting 
consistent results, we find that LOB,DBrok trades exhibit higher volatility than LOB,SBrok 
trades in the limit order book.  
We continue to look at volatility effects among different types of trades and stock sizes. For 
LOB,DBrok trades, the highest increase in volatility is always present in the larger stocks (i.e. 
quintiles 4 and 5). This phenomenon is seen in all post-event periods, highly significant at a 
1% level. Also, the smallest increase in volatility is always evident in the smaller stocks (i.e. 
quintile 1 and 2). Such results suggest that the larger stocks in the limit order trades 
represented by different broker face the greatest informational asymmetry in the anonymous 
market as they consistently show higher volatility than the smaller stocks.  
Similarly, for LOB,SBrok trades, we observe that the larger stocks consistently face the 
largest increase in volatility in post-event 1 and 2. Since the larger stocks continue to 
demonstrate the greatest increase in volatility in post-event 1 and 2, we say that the larger 
stocks in the LOB,SBrok trades will benefit from a more transparent market. When 
comparing between quintiles, we observe that the smallest increase in volatility in any post-
event period is always exhibited in the smaller quintiles (i.e. quintile 1 to 3). Thus, we 
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confirm that all LOB,SBrok trades show an increase in volatility but the larger stocks is often 
associated with the greatest increase in volatility in the anonymous regime and that the 
smallest increase in volatility is never present in the larger stocks in any investigated period.   
For SpCross trades, results are somewhat inconsistent, thus prohibiting us from making any 
inference about the difference between the quintiles. Overall, we can assert that all limit order 
trades increase in volatility, and that stocks with larger market capitalization in the limit order 
book are more likely to exhibit the greatest increase in volatility. This is in contention with 
hypothesis 3 that larger stocks benefit from a more transparent market.  
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6.2    MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The following discussion shall pertain to the multivariate results obtained by the regression 
equations described in section 5.2.4.  
We begin with the discussion for the regression results derived for traded value. These 
statistics are made available in tables 31 and 32.  
OLS regression for equation (1a) indicates that the removal of broker identifiers is associated 
with a fall in traded value for the overall market and the negative coefficient of the dummy 
variable is significant at a 5% level. The traded value for all trades is positively related to its 
own lag at a 1% level, which warrants the inclusion of further lags in the later equations. At a 
1% significant level, effective spreads are observed to have a positive association with the 
market’s traded value. There is an indication that volatility and traded value is negatively 
related, but this is not significant at all levels. It is observed that the greater the market 
capitalization of a stock, the higher is its traded value, which is significant at a 1% level. This 
complements our univariate results where the increase in the traded value of SpCross trades is 
seen in the larger stocks. Overall, the model has an R-squared of 0.7765 and a group of 
independent variables that possess high explanatory power. The fixed effects model for 
equation (1a) continues to show a negative association between the dummy variable and the 
market’s traded value. The t-statistic associated with the dummy variable changes from -2.15 
in the OLS regression to -2.19 in the fixed effects model. This suggests that the control of the 
characteristics of stocks via the fixed effects model is particularly suitable as it strengthens 
the significance of the dummy variable. The traded value continues to be positively related to 
its own lag and the effective spreads at a 1% significant level. However, now the volatility is 
positively related to the market’s traded value, but this is not significant. The fixed effects 
model has a slightly higher R-squared of 0.7775 than the OLS model and a set of independent 
variables that have high explanatory power.  
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When lagged traded values are included in equation (2a), OLS estimates for the anonymous 
broker identifier dummy variable continues to show a negative association with the market’s 
traded value. Although this is significant at a 5% level similar to equation (1a), the t-statistic 
associated with the coefficient of the dummy variable indicates that it is nearly close to the 
1% significant level when compared to equation (1a). This indicates that inclusion of lagged 
traded values produces stronger results that traded value for the market is significantly lower 
in the anonymous regime. Traded value continues to be positively associated with its first lag 
at a 1% significant level. However, traded value is negatively related to its second and third 
lag at a 1% significant level. The fourth lagged value of traded value shows a positive 
association with traded value, which is significant at a 10% level. Effective spreads continue 
to be positively associated with traded value. Volatility also continues to be negatively related 
to traded value, although it is still not significant. At a 1% significant level it is observed that 
a larger stock is associated with a higher traded value. With the inclusion of lagged values in 
equation (2a), the model now has a higher R-squared of 0.7820 along with a set of 
independent variables with high explanatory power as seen by the p-value of the F-statistic. 
The fixed effects regression of equation (2a) shows similar signs on the coefficients 
associated with the lagged traded values. Effective spreads continue to be positively and 
highly significant with traded value. Volatility also continues to indicate its negative relation 
with traded value, although it is not significant. The fixed effects model with the inclusion of 
lagged variables has caused the coefficient of the dummy variable to be negative and having 
a higher t-value of -2.41. As the p-value associated with this value is 0.0158, we can say that 
the dummy variable is significant at the 1% level, which is acceptable by most statisticians. 
As expected, this model produces the best overall fit and possesses independent variables that 
have high explanatory power.  
As a robustness check, we control for the effects of trend on the market’s traded value in 
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equation (5a). There continues to be an indication that in an anonymous regime, the market’s 
traded value is lower. When we add lags of the dependent variable in equation (6a), we obtain 
similar results. In reconciling with the unviariate results, the regression results confirm that 
the removal of broker identifiers has reduced overall traded value for the market, which 
confirms hypothesis 4. Previously, in our univariate results, we find that the larger stocks for 
SpCross trades are often represented by an increase in traded value in the anonymous regime. 
The positive association between a stock’s market capitalization and the traded value in our 
regression results again allows us to verify that the larger SpCross trades indeed benefit from 
a higher traded value after the market reform.  
OLS regression for equation (3a) shows that the removal of broker identifiers has decreased 
the traded value for LOB,DBrok trades, which is highly significant at a 1% level. The 
coefficient associated with the dummy variable is -1050.3, as compared to -345. 8 in equation 
(1a), when the dependent variable is the traded value for all trades. This stronger association 
between the dummy variable and the traded value for LOB,DBrok trades suggests that the 
anonymous regime has a more pronounced impact on decreasing the traded value for 
LOB,DBrok trades than all trades. Reconciling with our univariate results, we assert that this 
is because the increase in traded value of SpCross trades helps to reduce the magnitude of the 
lower traded value in the limit order book. We continue to observe that an increase in the 
traded value for LOB,DBrok trades in the previous period will cause an increase in traded 
value for these trades in the current period, which is highly significant at the 1% level. 
Effective spread and volatility are both positively and significant related to traded value in 
equation (3a) at a 1% significant level. At a 1% significant level, it is seen that a larger sized 
stock is associated with higher traded value. The model has an R-squared of 0.5624, which 
justifies the need to include more lags in the model. However, the set of independent 
variables are observed to have high explanatory power. The fixed effects regression for 
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equation (3a) shows that the dummy variable continues to be negatively related to traded 
value for LOB,DBrok trades. The coefficient of the dummy variable remains strong at a value 
of -803.8, which is still larger than both the OLS and fixed regression estimates of the 
dummy variable in equation (1a). Therefore, we are still able to assert the stronger relation 
between the dummy variable and traded value for LOB,DBrok trades than for all trades. 
Effective spread, volatility and the first lag of traded value remains positively related to 
traded value for LOB,DBrok trades at the 1% significant level.    
When we add lagged traded values in equation (4a), it is observed that the removal of broker 
identifies still continues to be negatively related to traded value for LOB,DBrok trades. We 
hereby confirm that the decline in the traded value for LOB,DBrok trades is evident in both 
the univariate and multivariate results. Traded value for LOB,DBrok trades is negatively 
related to its first and third lag, while being positively related to its second and fourth lag. 
Similar to the traded value for all trades, effective spread of the market is positively related to 
the traded value for LOB,DBrok trades at the 1% significant level. Volatility is positively 
related to the dependent variable in equation (4a) although it is not significant. Also, stocks 
with higher market capitalization are associated with higher traded value for LOB,DBrok 
trades. The model has a good overall fit of an R-squared that equals to 0.9840 and a set of 
independent variables that have high explanatory power. The fixed effects regression 
continues to produce similar values for the negative coefficient associated with the dummy 
variable. The lags of the dependent variable continue to produce the similar signs as the OLS 
estimates. Both effective spread and volatility continue to be positively related to the traded 
value for LOB,DBrok trades, but the latter is only almost close to a 10% significant level.  
Next, we are interested to analyse the effects of the crossed and internalised trades on the 
limit order book (of different broker trades) and on the overall market. In equation (7a), we 
observe that the removal of broker identifiers continues to indicate a decrease in traded value. 
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Perhaps of greater importance is that the market share of the LOB,DBrok trades is negatively 
associated with the traded value for all trades, which is highly significant at a 1% level. This 
lends support for our univariate results whereby we observe that although all limit order 
trades decrease, the decrease for LOB,SBrok trades is always greater than LOB,DBrok trades. 
When we add lagged values of the dependent variable as seen in equation (8a), we obtain 
similar results. Reconciling with our univariate results, we assert that the reduction in the 
market’s overall traded value is a result of the lower proportion of the on-market crossed and 
internalized trades. In the univariate results, we observe an increase in traded value for the 
large crossed trades (SpCross) while the crossed and internalised trades in the limit order 
book exhibit a significant decline in traded value. Therefore, we confirm that the broker 
identity reform causes liquidity trading to move away from crossed and internalised trades in 
the limit order book and that this shift has led to a reduction in the market’s traded value. 
Such finding signals that the uniformed traders have fewer incentives to participate after the 
change in trading protocol. There continues to be a positive association between the market 
capitalization of a stock and the traded value in equation (8a). Both effective spreads and 
volatility is positively associated with the traded value, although the latter is not significant.  
In examining equation (9a), we observe that the market share for LOB,DBrok trades is 
positively related to its own traded value, which is highly significant at a 1% level. Also, the 
coefficient of the dummy variable suggests that in the anonymous regime, the traded value is 
lower. In other words, the lower traded value in the LOB,DBrok trades is the result of a lower 
market share of the LOB,DBrok trades. Hence, the lower traded value in the LOB,DBrok 
trades is due to a greater proportion of a higher market share of the large crossed trades in the 
off-market (i.e. SpCross trades), which is observed in the univariate results. When we add 
lags of the dependent variable as depicted in (10a), we obtain similar results for the 
coefficient associated with the LOB,DBrok market share and dummy variable. As a 
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robustness check, we use the same equation in (10a) by replacing the LOB,DBrok market 
share with the market share of the SpCross trades. This allows us to measure the association 
of the market share of the large special crossings on the LOB,DBrok traded value. We obtain 
an indication that the market share of the SpCross trades is negatively related to the traded 
value of the LOB,DBrok trades. Thus, we confirm that the reduction in the traded value of 
the LOB,DBrok trades is due to the shift of liquidity to the large special crossings in the 
anonymous regime.  
The multivariate analysis confers an interesting finding here: when all trades are combined, 
the lower traded value in the overall market is deemed to be mainly attributable to the 
significant lower traded value of the LOB,SBrok trades, which is also evident in the 
univariate results. Results signal that the shift of trading to the large special crossings off-
market exerts a negative externality on the LOB,DBrok trades, which confirms hypothesis 5. 
This negative externality is characterized by the lower traded value in the limit order book (of 
different trades), while the SpCross trades increase in traded value. This is evident in both the 
univariate and multivariate results. In other words, we confirm that the broker identity reform 
shifts liquidity trading away from crossed and internalised trades on-market, while the 
volume in the special crossings increases tremendously. The former impacts upon the lower 
traded value of the overall market, while the latter is associated with the lower traded value in 
the LOB,DBrok trades. With regards to the limit order book, we confirm that its traded value 
has decreased after the market reform, and that the reduction in traded value is the greatest 
for the limit order trades represented by the same brokers. However, the smaller stocks in the 
limit order book may benefit from the anonymous market as the decline in the traded value of 
the limit orders is mainly attributable to the larger stock. In the univariate results, for SpCross 
trades, all, but the smallest stocks are often associated with a higher traded value in the post-
event period. This again confirms the proposition that the anonymous market is more 
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beneficial for smaller stocks. This is also in contention with the multivariate results which 
show that the larger the stock’s market capitalization, the greater will be its traded value. All 
in all, the larger crossed trades benefit the most from this market reform when they are traded 
in the more transparent off-market, which is in accordance with Madhavan (1996). On one 
hand, one may argue that the results show that the higher traded value in the off-market 
crossed trades provides additional liquidity to the market. This is important to ASX as there is 
a significant decrease of traded value in the limit order book. However, the results 
demonstrate that the SpCross trades still cannot aid in totally off-setting the significant 
decline in traded value of the on-market trades. Therefore, if the traded value in the limit 
order book continues to decrease indefinitely, it is suggested that the shift of liquidity to 
SpCross trades exerts a negative externality on the liquidity on-market. Also, the significant 
reduction in traded value among the LOB,SBrok trades suggests that the change in trading 
protocol has caused uninformed traders to have lesser incentives to trade. If so, the broker 
identity reform will be seen as a mechanism that permits only larger and informed traders to 
operate in disguise.  
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Next, we continue to discuss the regression estimates derived for effective spreads. These 
statistics are available in tables 33 and 34.  
The OLS estimates from equation (1b) show that the increase in the overall effective spreads 
of the market is associated with the removal of broker identifiers, as denoted by the positive 
coefficient of the dummy variable, although it is not statistically significant. The significant 
positive association between the effective spread and its lag warrants the inclusion of further 
lags in the later equations. Also, both traded value and volatility are positively related to 
effective spreads, although the latter is not statistically significant. Results suggest that a 
larger sized stock is associated with lower spreads, but this is not significant. Overall, the 
model has a high R-squared value of 0.9805 and suggests that the independent variables serve 
as appropriate explanatory variables with the 1% significant F-value. The fixed effects model 
for equation (1b) produces the same signs for the coefficients of the independent variables. 
The dummy variable continues to be positively signed, although it is still not significant.  
By means of OLS regression, results from equation (2b) show that the lagged effective 
spreads are statistically significant for inclusion in the model. Traded value continues to be 
positively related to the effective spread at a 1% level. However, when lagged effective 
spreads are included, volatility is now negatively but not significantly related to the effective 
spread. The coefficient on market capitalization is now positive and not significant; the t-
statistic associated with this coefficient is higher than that in (1b). This is similar to our 
univariate results where we find that the largest increase in effective spreads for the 
LOB,DBrok trades are always found in the larger stocks. The dummy variable continues to 
be positively related to effective spreads. Although it is still not significant, we observe an 
improvement in its significance from the t-statistic. Overall, the model produces an 
improvement in the R-squared 0.9841, suggesting an enhanced fit of this equation. Similar to 
the OLS regression, the fixed effects model for equation (2b) show that greater traded value 
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is associated with higher effective spread at a 1% level. Volatility continues to remain 
negatively related to effective spread, which is now significant at a 10% level. The dummy 
variable is still positively related to effective spreads, with a p-value of 0.1844, which is now 
extremely close to a 10% significant level.  
When we control for the trend effects on the effective spreads of the market, we continue to 
see an indication that the removal of broker identifiers causes an increase in the overall 
transaction costs in the market. We obtain similar results when we add in lagged values of 
effective spreads for all trades as the dependent variable, with the control of the trend effects. 
Overall, we obtain a persistent indication that the overall transaction costs in the market is 
higher when broker identifiers are removed, which is in accordance with the unviariate results. 
We hereby confirm hypothesis 2.  
Through OLS, results for equation (3b) indicates that the removal of broker identifiers 
decreases the effective spread for LOB,DBrok trades, but it is not significant. The greater the 
size of a stock, the greater will be the effective spread for LOB,DBrok trades, which is 
significant at a 1% level. In our unviariate results, we find that for LOB,DBrok trades, the 
larger stocks are associated with higher effective spreads. Once again, the multivarate 
analysis indicates that the increase in transactional costs for LOB,DBrok trades is often 
associated with stocks that possess larger market capitalization. Therefore, we confirm that in 
the limit order book, the market reform provides lower transaction costs for the smaller 
stocks of the LOB,DBrok trades. Volatility and traded value are positively related to the 
dependent variable, although the former is not significant. The effective spread for 
LOB,DBrok trades is positively and significantly related to its lag, which warrants the 
inclusion of additional lags. Overall, the p-value associated with the F-statistic suggests that 
the independent variables serve as good explanatory variables in the model. Results of the 
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fixed effects model for equation (3b) produce somewhat similar results to the OLS regression 
for the coefficients.     
Inclusion of lagged values of effective spread for LOB,DBrok trades in equation (4b) now 
shows that the removal of broker identifiers has increased the effective spreads for all 
LOB,DBrok trades, which is consistent with our univariate findings. The p-value obtained for 
the coefficient of the dummy variable is 0.1370, which is extremely close to a 10% 
significant level. Volatility and traded value continues to be positively related to the 
dependent variable, although the former is not significant. The coefficient for market 
capitalization is now negative, but it is not significant. The fixed effects model for equation 
(4b) continues to show that LOB,DBrok trades are associated with higher effective spreads in 
the anonymous regime, with an improved p-value of 0.1032. This is considered as significant 
at a 10% level by most statisticians, which confirms hypothesis 2 that there is a significant 
rise in effective spreads for LOB,DBrok trades. Volatility and traded value continues to be 
positively related to the dependent variable.  
Overall, we confirm that the removal of broker identifiers is associated with the higher 
effective spreads for LOB,DBrok trades. This is in accordance with the results in our 
univariate analysis. Also, larger stocks are associated with higher increase in effective 
spreads for the LOB,DBrok trades.  
OLS regression for equation (7b) shows that the increase in the market’s overall effective 
spreads is associated with a decrease in the market share of LOB,DBrok trades, which is 
significant at the 10% level. This shows that the lower market share of LOB,DBrok trades in 
the anonymous regime deteriorates market quality. Also, this means that the increase in 
market share for crossed and internalized trades impacts on the market’s higher transaction 
costs. To be more specific, it is the market share of off-market crossed trades, in the form of 
large special crossings, which have increased in the anonymous regime. The univariate 
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results show that, while traded value for crossed and internalized trades in the limit order 
book decreases, the traded value of the SpCross trades increases. We have a clear signal here 
that it is the shift of liquidity to the off-market crossed trades that creates a higher negative 
externality on the overall market in the anonymous regime, which confirms hypothesis 1. 
This negative externality is characterized by the increased overall effective spreads of the 
market. With the inclusion of lagged values of the market’s effective spread, equation (8b) 
continues to show an indicative negative association between LOB,DBrok market share and 
the effective spreads for all trades. Also, we now obtain results that there is an increase in 
effective spreads in the anonymous regime. Although this is not significant, the t-statistic 
associated with the dummy variable is much higher than that in (7b), indicating our 
preference for model (8b). As a robustness check, we use the same equation in (8b) and 
replace the market share of the LOB,DBrok trades with the market share for SpCross trades. 
Results show a positive association between the market share of SpCross trades with the 
effective spread of the market. Therefore, it is evident that the higher of market share of 
SpCross trades imposes a higher transaction costs on the market.  We confirm hypothesis 5 
that the rise in the market’s transaction costs is a result of the migration of liquidity to the 
crossed trades off-market due to the value inherent in broker identity available in these trades. 
We assert that the special crossings exert a negative externality on the transaction costs of the 
market. 
Through OLS, results for equation (9b) shows that the higher the market share of 
LOB,DBrok trades, the higher the effective spreads for LOB,DBrok trades, which is 
significant at a 1% level. When we add lagged values of the effective spreads for LOB,DBrok 
trades in equation (10b), the dummy variable coefficient is more statistically significant than 
that in (9b). Thus, we accept equation (10b) as the better fitted model. The results indicate 
that in the anonymous regime, the effective spread for LOB,DBrok trades are higher. There 
67 
 
continues to be a positive association between the market share of the LOB,DBrok trades and 
its effective spread. Such results suggest that the lower market share of crossed and 
internalized trades increases the transaction costs of the LOB,DBrok trades. We attribute the 
lower market share of crossed and internalized trades to only those in the limit order book (i.e. 
LOB,SBrok) according to the univariate results. Therefore, even when the market share of the 
LOB,DBrok trades is higher than that of the LOB,SBrok trades, effective spreads of  the 
former still increase. Such findings propose that the lower market share of crossed and 
internalized trades in the limit order book has important ramifications on the transactional 
costs of all limit orders. Lack of liquidity in the LOB,SBrok trades not only increases the 
effective spreads for the LOB,SBrok trades increase, but it also increases the effective 
spreads for LOB,DBrok trades.  
Overall, we see that the change in trading protocol causes a shift of liquidity to the large 
special crossings off-market. It is evident that the higher liquidity in the large special 
crossings offer lower transaction costs as observed in the univariate results. We confirm that 
the shift of liquidity to the special crossing trades in turn exerts a negative externality on the 
market, which is evident in the higher effective spreads in the market. Results also show that 
a higher market share of LOB,DBrok trades than the LOB,SBrok trades does not necessarily 
aid in decreasing the transaction costs for the former. Certainly, the results indicate that the 
lack of liquidity in the LOB,SBrok trades is detrimental to the transaction costs of the limit 
order book.  
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Next, we look at the regression results derived for volatility. These statistics are available in 
tables 35 and 36.  
OLS regression for equation (1c) indicates that in the anonymous regime, volatility for the 
market is lower. Volatility is positively related to its own lag, which is significant at the 1% 
level. Thus, it is necessary to add further lags in the later analysis in order to fully control for 
the presence of autocorrelation. At a 5% significant level, it is observed that the greater the 
average number of trades per day, the lower the market’s volatility. There is a negative 
association between a stock’s market capitalization and its volatility, but this is not significant. 
The model has a relatively high R-squared of 0.9968. The fixed effects model for equation 
(1c) continues to show the negative association between the anonymous regime and volatility, 
but the strength of the association is slightly lower now, although it is still significant. Similar 
signs are obtained for the coefficients of the first lagged volatility and the average number of 
trades per day. Both of these associations are significant at a 1% level. The model has a good 
overall fit.  
When we include lagged values of volatility in equation (2c), we find that the removal of 
broker identifiers is now associated with an increase in the market’s volatility, which is 
significant at a 10% level. This reconciles with our univariate results, in which we find an 
overall increase in market volatility. At a 1% significant level, volatility is positively related 
to its first and third lag and negatively related with its second and fourth lag. Market volatility 
continues to be negatively related to a stock’s market capitalization, although the parameter 
estimate is still not significant. There continues to be a negative association between the 
average number of daily trades and market volatility, but this is not significant. Equation (2c) 
with lagged values of the dependent variable has a higher R-squared of 0.9983. Therefore, we 
pronounce the OLS model with lagged variables to be more accurately specified than 
equation (1c) as it has a higher R-squared compared to the latter. Also, the p-value associated 
69 
 
with the F-statistic indicates that the included independent variables have very high 
explanatory power. Analysis of equation (2c) through the fixed effects model shows that the 
removal of broker identifiers continues to show a positive association with volatility, which is 
significant at a 10% level. Coefficients of the lagged values of volatility produce similar signs 
as the OLS regression. The negative association between the average number of daily trades 
and market volatility is still present, but also not significant. The model shows a high overall 
fit.  
When we control for the effects of trend in equations (5c) and (6c), we obtain certainty that 
the anonymous regime is associated with a higher volatility, which is highly significant at a 
1% level. Consequently, we confirm hypothesis 3 that in the anonymous regime, volatility is 
higher in the market for all trades, which is similar to what is found in the univariate analysis. 
OLS estimates of equation (3c) indicate that LOB,DBrok trades experience lower volatility in 
the anonymous regime. Volatility for LOB,DBrok trades is positively related to its first lag at 
a 1% significant level. There is an indication that the greater the average number of trades per 
day, the greater will be the volatility for LOB,DBrok trades, but this is not significant. At a 
10% significant level, the volatility of LOB,DBrok trades is positively associated with the 
stock’s market capitalization. The model has an R-squared of 0.9953. The fixed effects model 
for equation (3c) shows that there continues to be a negative association between the 
volatility of LOB,DBrok trades and the removal of broker identifiers. There continues to be 
an indication that there is a positive but not significant relation between the average number 
of daily trades and the volatility for LOB,DBrok trades. The lag volatility continues to show a 
positive association with the dependent variable. The model has a good overall fit.   
When we add lagged values of volatility for LOB,DBrok trades in equation (4c), we observe 
that the removal of broker identifiers causes an increase in the volatility for LOB,DBrok 
trades, although it is not significant. We assert that this model is superior in its specification 
70 
 
than equation (3c) as it has a higher R-squared of 0.9976 and it controls for the lagged values 
of volatility. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is confirmed that LOB,DBrok trades experience an 
increase in volatility, which reconciles with the univariate results. Similarly, equation (4c) 
also shows that the dependent variable is positively related to its first and third lag, while 
being negatively related to its second and fourth lag. The model stipulates that a larger stock 
is associated with higher volatility. This is in conjunction with our univariate results, whereby 
we find that the larger stocks in the limit order book always experience higher volatility. Also, 
the average number of daily trades is negatively related to the volatility for LOB,DBrok 
trades. In line with our univariate results, we confirm that the limit order trades represented 
by different brokers experience an increase in volatility in the anonymous regime and those 
stocks with a larger market capitalization are associated with greater volatility. The fixed 
effects model for equation (4c) continues to show the positive association between volatility 
and the removal of broker identifiers. The t-statistic is also much stronger now. The lags of 
the dependent variable continue to produce similar signs as the OLS estimates. Also, the 
average number of daily trades continues to be negatively related to the volatility for 
LOB,DBrok trades. The model also has an excellent overall fit with a set of independent 
variables that provide high explanatory power.  
OLS estimates for equation (7c) show that in the anonymous regime, volatility of the market 
is lower. However, when we add lags of the dependent variable in equation (8c), the OLS 
estimate of the coefficient associated with the dummy variable depicts that the higher 
volatility is associated with the anonymous regime. A robustness test via the fixed effects 
regression for equation (8c) also provides similar results as its OLS regression. We notice 
that equation (8c) has a higher R-squared than (7c), suggesting a better overall fit of the 
model Also, as the lagged values of volatility show statistical significance, it is necessary to 
control for their effects on the dependent variable (i.e. market volatility). Thus, we assert that 
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equation (8c) is a better specified model than (7c). We go on to observe the coefficient 
associated with the LOB,DBrok market share to analyse the effects of trades represented by 
the same brokers. Even when lagged values of volatility are included, there continues to be a 
positive association between the market share of LOB,DBrok trades and market volatility. 
Although this relation is still not significant, we manage to obtain a higher t-statistic 
associated with the LOB,DBrok market share variable. Thus, we assert that the higher 
volatility of the market is a result of the lower market share of the LOB,SBrok trades. 
Consequently, the market reform may have caused liquidity in the limit order book to move 
towards the limit order trades (of different brokers). Despite so, the overall market volatility 
still increases significantly. In other words, the lower market share of crossed and 
internalized trades is important as its loss of market share impacts upon the higher volatility 
observed in the anonymous market.  
In equation (9c), we observe that there is an indication of a  positive association between the 
market share of LOB,DBrok and the volatility of these limit orders which are represented by 
different brokers. Also, results show that in the anonymous regime, the volatility of 
LOB,DBrok trades is lower. When we modify this equation to include lagged variables of 
volatility in equation (10c), we find that now in the anonymous regime, volatility of 
LOB,DBrok trades is higher. We observe that equation (10c) is a better fitted model than 
equation (9c) as it has a higher R-squared of 0.9976, compared to that of 0.9953 obtained in 
(9c). Also, the lagged values of volatility are highly significant at a 1% level, indicating that 
the effects of these lagged values have to be controlled for in our analysis of the impacted 
volatility. Therefore, there is justification for accepting equation (10c) as a better specified 
model than (9c). Thus, we confirm that the removal of broker identifiers will increase the 
volatility for LOB,DBrok trades. Such results also reconcile with our univariate results, 
whereby higher volatility is observed for LOB,DBrok trades. In equation (10c), we continue 
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to observe an indication that the higher volatility of the LOB,DBrok trades is associated with 
a higher market share inherent in these trades. In other words, the volatility in LOB,DBrok 
trades is directly impacted by its own higher market share. Such results signal that even when 
the market share of LOB,DBrok trades is high, it does not necessary aid in reducing its 
volatility. Overall, results persistently point to the importance of the presence of liquidity in 
the on-market crossed and internalized trades. It is apparent that the market reform causes 
liquidity to shift away from the on-market crossed and internalized trades. Failure to sustain a 
reasonable level of liquidity in these trades causes volatility of the market and the limit order 
book to increase at an unhealthy rate. Indeed, a market that is too volatile is certainly not 
beneficial for market participants and does not attract order flow. Since a market is made up 
of distinct and complex needs from different types of traders, it is up to the discretion of ASX 
to judge if this shift of liquidity away from the on-market crossed and internalized trades is 
deemed to be beneficial or not for the market without the presence of broker identifiers. 
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7    CONCLUSION  
Trading on the ASX can take place via the limit order book or off-market. The limit order 
book consists of trades represented by different brokers (i.e. LOB,DBrok) and crossed and 
internalized trades (i.e. LOB,SBrok). Crossed trades with larger portfolios are traded in the 
off-market, which are classified as large special crossings (i.e. SpCross). With the differing 
characteristics of these trades in mind, this thesis goes on to examine the market quality of 
the market and its different types of trades after the removal of broker identifiers on the ASX 
on 28 November 2005. To the extent that broker identity contains valuable information in the 
form of pre-trade transparency, we hypothesise that there will be a shift of liquidity to crossed 
and internalized trades and large special crossings. Thus, the first objective of this thesis is to 
examine how the market reform has impacted on the market’s transaction costs, trading value 
and volatility. We do this by examining these variables for the combined trades (i.e. overall 
market) and by trade types separately. Our second objective is to examine if the change in 
trading protocol causes the shift of liquidity to the crossed and internalized trades and large 
special crossings to exert a negative externality on the limit order book and the overall market.  
If the crossed and internalized trades and large special crossings do exert a negative 
externality, these trades should exhibit higher market quality in comparison to the limit order 
trades represented by different brokers.  
In order to analyse the impact of the removal of broker identifiers on the three liquidity 
determinants, we compare the difference in means of each variable over a pre- and post-event 
period through a univariate analysis. To provide robustness check, this comparison is done 
over three pre- and post-event periods.  In order to discern the exact impact of the market 
reform on each liquidity determinant, we conduct multiviariate analysis to control for other 
factors that may impact upon the variable of interest. This is done through the method of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the fixed effects model.    
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Results from the univariate and multivariate analysis confirm that traded value for the overall 
market has fallen significantly in the anonymous regime, which lends support for hypothesis 
4. The market’s lower traded value is highly associated with the lower market share of the 
on-market crossed and internalized trades. Specifically, the change in trading protocol is 
observed to impact upon a lower traded value in the limit order book, which shows support 
for hypothesis 4. This shows further sustainability of the proposition that traders submit lesser 
limit order trades in the absence of broker identifiers. As a reduction in traded value for all 
limit order trades is mainly attributable to the larger stocks, the market reform does provide 
some benefits for the smaller stocks of the limit order book. On the other hand, we confirm 
our hypothesis that there is a shift of liquidity to the special crossings off-market, which is 
evident from the vast increase in traded value for these trades. Indeed, such results lend 
support to the explanation of the value inherent in broker identifiers. The SpCross trades in 
all investigated periods demonstrate that all, but the smallest stocks show immense increase 
in traded value. Thus, we verify that the larger stocks for SpCross trades benefit the most 
from the market reform. We assert that such results confer that the special crossings can be a 
source of liquidity discovery for the ASX. However, this advantage must be weighed against 
the negative externality that comes from these large crossed trades. Firstly, the negative 
externality is described as attracting order flow away from on-market trades due to its greater 
liquidity. Indeed, results show that this shift of liquidity to the SpCross trades impacts upon a 
lower traded value of the LOB,DBrok trades. Secondly, the market reform will enable large 
and informed trades to operate in disguise off-market, which is a second negative externality 
for all other market participants as the proportion of informed trading increases.    
We obtain a significant increase in effective spreads in the overall market after the removal of 
broker identifiers, which shows that hypothesis 2 is supported. Specific results illustrate that 
the limit order book shows persistent increase in effective spreads in all investigated periods, 
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while the SpCross trades exhibit progressive decline in effective spreads. We observe that the 
greatest increase in effective spreads for LOB,DBrok trades and the greatest reduction in 
effective spreads in SpCross is mainly attributable to the larger stocks. This is in line with 
Madhavan (1996) that larger stocks benefit from a more transparent market. In other words, 
we can say that the change in trading protocol provides some benefits for the smaller stocks. 
Our multivariate analysis shows that although the market share of LOB,DBrok trades is 
higher than the LOB,SBrok trades, the former’s effective spreads still increase. In other 
words, we assert that a lower market share of the crossed and internalized trades on-market is 
detrimental to the transaction costs of the limit order book. The persistent decrease in 
effective spreads for the SpCross trades signals that there is higher liquidity in these trades 
due to the ability to identify brokers, which is consistent with hypothesis 1. We also manage 
to confirm that the higher transaction cost in the market is a result of the shift of liquidity to 
the special crossings off-market. As we find that the on-market crossed and internalized 
trades exhibit higher effective spreads in contrast to their larger counterparts, it signals that 
the anonymous market becomes a mechanism that enables large and informed traders to 
operate in disguise. To the extent that one may argue that the off-market provides higher 
liquidity in the form of lower transaction costs, this advantage has to be weighed against the 
possibility of these large SpCross trades creating a negative externality on the transaction 
costs of the on-market trades.  
Pertaining to the impact of the removal of broker identifier on volatility, we obtain a higher 
volatility measure for all trade types in all investigated post-event periods, which confirms 
hypothesis 3. Specifically, the higher volatility in the limit order book is highly associated 
with the larger stocks. Thus, we assert that the market reform is indeed the least beneficial for 
the larger stocks as they exhibit higher volatility in the anonymous regime. We confirm that 
the higher market volatility of the entire market and the LOB,DBrok trades is a result of the 
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lower market share of the crossed and internalized trades on-market. Such results confer that 
even if the market share of LOB,DBrok trades is higher in the anonymous regime, it does not 
aid in reducing the volatility for the limit order book (of different brokers). We pronounce 
that the lower market share of the on-market crossed and internalized trades is not beneficial 
for the market. Hereby, we pronounce that the on-market crossed and internalized trades are 
an important source of liquidity. A lack of liquidity in these trades impacts upon a higher 
volatility in the limit order trades represented by different brokers and on the overall market. 
We confirm that the anonymous market is associated with higher informational asymmetry, 
which is especially not beneficial for the uninformed traders.  
In summary, we show that the removal of broker identifiers on the ASX has a significant 
impact on the market quality measures. We confirm that the removal of broker identifiers 
effects on a fall in traded value, an increase in transaction costs and an increase in intraday 
volatility. Results indicate that the large special crossings exhibit the best market quality 
measures in the anonymous regime. Specifically, there is a strong signal that the better 
informed institutions and their brokers, who are mostly active in the larger stocks gain more 
advantage from their position after the market reform. Further, we manage to obtain similar 
results with Madhavan (1996) that larger firms benefit more from a transparent market. We 
conclude that there is value in greater pre-trade transparency in the form of the disclosure of 
broker identification.  
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APPENDICES 
TABLE 1: MONTHLY MEAN TRADED VALUE (MILLION AUD) 
 
200509 200510 200511 200512 200601 200602 200603 200604 200605 200606 200607 200608 200609
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 7,144 7,151 6,463 7,569 6,796 7,102 7,557 7,642 7,577 6,364 6,578 6,927 7,190
LOB,SBrok 22,326 21,217 18,218 26,176 17,384 30,587 34,440 23,121 30,466 21,365 32,812 33,431 27,217
SpCross 3,831,768 2,825,310 1,939,753 2,272,777 1,552,605 3,297,322 3,533,763 2,116,708 1,541,635 2,072,745 2,222,611 2,684,303 3,344,851
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 7,842 7,994 7,185 7,397 7,160 6,936 7,911 8,335 7,311 6,681 5,450 6,174 7,482
LOB,SBrok 31,334 24,610 28,773 26,739 19,969 31,524 30,134 35,005 34,893 39,444 27,249 32,584 48,517
SpCross 3,252,470 2,439,704 2,321,579 3,542,813 2,165,931 7,196,431 2,850,908 4,570,331 7,132,924 3,431,555 2,829,146 2,736,325 4,152,630
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 10,784 9,667 9,342 9,780 9,392 8,735 10,155 8,983 8,833 9,267 7,433 8,892 8,219
LOB,SBrok 85,215 70,839 70,500 59,649 52,280 53,190 77,186 53,826 59,603 60,977 58,599 53,629 60,739
SpCross 4,106,231 2,499,006 2,143,655 5,231,371 3,214,010 3,020,973 4,766,992 2,412,501 2,809,804 4,080,239 2,994,131 3,008,348 3,902,470
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 14,646 14,312 13,785 15,992 12,813 13,332 16,344 13,293 13,466 14,074 10,702 11,374 13,754
LOB,SBrok 137,932 112,018 127,360 107,167 88,714 93,650 112,164 90,969 110,223 92,784 86,552 89,200 118,737
SpCross 3,276,813 2,836,738 3,858,755 5,179,543 2,926,977 2,905,053 4,508,997 2,980,824 5,150,462 3,681,686 3,663,048 3,202,297 3,986,141
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 41,607 38,095 40,424 41,357 37,083 37,912 38,863 36,224 35,851 37,103 30,690 33,291 34,841
LOB,SBrok 226,132 192,369 241,830 206,178 162,250 174,533 189,458 181,264 190,983 164,833 150,145 163,502 226,550
SpCross 4,720,805 3,999,936 4,232,458 4,300,275 3,889,475 4,995,728 5,229,736 4,977,435 4,567,832 4,610,532 4,308,251 4,961,895 4,530,538  
 
This table shows the monthly mean traded value for the whole data sample for the months 
including 200509 to 200609. The traded values are reported in million Australian dollars. 
Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with the smallest 
market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market capitalization.  
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TABLE 2 : MONTHLY MEAN EFFECTIVE SPREADS 
 
200509 200510 200511 200512 200601 200602 200603 200604 200605 200606 200607 200608 200609
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 0.0042 0.0108 0.0042 0.0052 0.0046 0.0050 0.0078 0.0051 0.0049 0.0105 0.0056 0.0047 0.0053
LOB,SBrok 0.0100 0.0106 0.0112 0.0088 0.0117 0.0507 0.2010 0.0155 0.0228 0.0103 0.0377 0.0113 0.0140
SpCross 0.0558 0.0254 0.0265 0.0157 0.0113 0.0621 0.1398 0.0197 0.0181 0.0400 0.0636 0.0171 0.0455
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 0.0065 0.0070 0.0063 0.0079 0.0067 0.0067 0.0084 0.0073 0.0075 0.0076 0.0055 0.0058 0.0067
LOB,SBrok 0.0177 0.0178 0.0155 0.0193 0.0129 0.0136 0.0209 0.0124 0.0337 0.0306 0.0137 0.0172 0.0259
SpCross 0.0436 0.0440 0.0379 0.0614 0.0243 0.0588 0.0509 0.0412 0.0325 0.0712 0.0351 0.0457 0.0440
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 0.0075 0.0074 0.0069 0.0097 0.0068 0.0074 0.0079 0.0086 0.0084 0.0120 0.0069 0.0062 0.0078
LOB,SBrok 0.0160 0.0437 0.0186 0.0249 0.5210 0.0406 0.0168 0.0203 0.0546 0.0326 0.0214 0.0196 0.0241
SpCross 1.3152 0.0295 0.0286 0.0267 0.0958 0.0349 0.4293 0.0309 0.2281 0.6030 0.7855 0.1235 0.0350
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 0.0130 0.0163 0.0157 0.0171 0.0165 0.0146 0.0438 0.0140 0.0181 0.0176 0.0137 0.0125 0.0133
LOB,SBrok 0.0262 0.0639 0.0505 0.0279 0.8449 0.0278 0.0495 0.0367 0.3465 0.0367 0.0738 0.0326 0.0364
SpCross 0.1013 0.1707 0.0384 0.4251 0.0290 0.0420 0.1350 0.0483 0.4816 0.1969 0.0501 0.2115 0.0688
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 0.0422 0.0418 0.0479 0.0744 0.0426 0.0634 0.0488 0.0497 0.0498 0.0663 0.0443 0.0410 0.0677
LOB,SBrok 0.0791 0.0969 0.1125 0.1757 0.5927 0.1340 0.0960 0.1056 0.2813 0.1538 0.0922 0.0888 0.1325
SpCross 2.0759 0.2559 0.0857 1.7182 0.1188 0.1497 0.1120 0.6572 0.2504 0.1884 0.3952 0.3170 0.3515
  
This table shows the monthly mean effective spreads for the whole data sample for the 
months including 200509 to 200609. Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. 
Quintile 1 represents stocks with the smallest market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents 
stocks with the largest market capitalization.   
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TABLE 3: MONTHLY MEAN INTRADAY VOLATILITY 
 
200509 200510 200511 200512 200601 200602 200603 200604 200605 200606 200607 200608 200609
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 2.7784 2.7689 2.9145 3.0117 2.9529 2.9818 2.9851 3.1354 3.1741 3.3684 3.3097 3.3437 3.3548
LOB,SBrok 2.7502 2.7581 2.9201 2.9943 2.9442 2.9731 2.9813 3.1384 3.1752 3.3879 3.3018 3.3473 3.3604
SpCross 2.7435 2.6433 2.8671 2.8155 2.8713 2.9569 2.9987 3.1243 2.9936 3.5669 3.2062 3.3267 3.4086
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 2.8041 2.7574 2.9109 2.9670 2.9424 3.0310 2.9953 3.1653 3.1798 3.3460 3.3625 3.3410 3.3479
LOB,SBrok 2.7956 2.7495 2.9161 2.9815 2.9376 3.0273 2.9950 3.1540 3.1624 3.3600 3.3237 3.3385 3.3430
SpCross 2.8477 2.7322 2.7972 2.9151 3.1354 3.2291 3.0078 3.0795 3.1313 3.5123 3.8267 3.3121 3.4932
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 2.8026 2.7796 2.9018 2.9610 2.9472 3.0619 3.0012 3.1579 3.1991 3.3515 3.3544 3.3404 3.3563
LOB,SBrok 2.7919 2.7845 2.9051 2.9526 2.9421 3.0375 2.9970 3.1594 3.1892 3.3542 3.3607 3.3414 3.3627
SpCross 2.7816 2.8506 2.8602 3.1449 2.8812 2.9678 2.9827 3.0902 3.2663 3.3467 3.2904 3.3505 3.3545
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 2.7846 2.7734 2.9076 2.9756 2.9562 3.0573 3.0077 3.1537 3.1876 3.3467 3.3545 3.3456 3.3552
LOB,SBrok 2.7866 2.7713 2.9128 2.9855 2.9563 3.0335 3.0158 3.1499 3.1930 3.3417 3.3717 3.3474 3.3575
SpCross 2.7646 2.7672 2.8662 3.0763 2.9547 2.9993 2.9906 3.2768 3.1706 3.3408 3.3657 3.3445 3.3757
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 2.7860 2.7756 2.9105 2.9798 2.9566 3.0386 3.0024 3.1730 3.1856 3.3577 3.3339 3.3435 3.3635
LOB,SBrok 2.7912 2.7748 2.9154 2.9884 2.9572 3.0387 3.0034 3.1702 3.1921 3.3610 3.3585 3.3414 3.3645
SpCross 2.8123 2.7608 2.8514 2.9756 2.9478 3.0387 3.0054 3.1829 3.1864 3.3680 3.2927 3.3417 3.3864  
 
This table shows the monthly mean volatility of the whole data sample for the months 
including 200509 to 200609. Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 
represents stocks with the smallest market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with 
the largest market capitalization.   
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TABLE 4: TRADED VALUE FOR PRE AND POST EVENT 1 (MILLION AUD) 
 
200509 200510 200511 200512 200601 200602 Diff(%)
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 7,144 7,151 6,463 7,569 6,796 7,102 3.41
LOB,SBrok 22,326 21,217 18,218 26,176 17,384 30,587 20.05
SpCross 3,831,768 2,825,310 1,939,753 2,272,777 1,552,605 3,297,322 -17.15
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 7,842 7,994 7,185 7,397 7,160 6,936 -6.63
LOB,SBrok 31,334 24,610 28,773 26,739 19,969 31,524 -7.65
SpCross 3,252,470 2,439,704 2,321,579 3,542,813 2,165,931 7,196,431 61.04
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 10,784 9,667 9,342 9,780 9,392 8,735 -6.33
LOB,SBrok 85,215 70,839 70,500 59,649 52,280 53,190 -27.12
SpCross 4,106,231 2,499,006 2,143,655 5,231,371 3,214,010 3,020,973 31.06
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 14,646 14,312 13,785 15,992 12,813 13,332 -1.42
LOB,SBrok 137,932 112,018 127,360 107,167 88,714 93,650 -23.26
SpCross 3,276,813 2,836,738 3,858,755 5,179,543 2,926,977 2,905,053 10.42
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 41,607 38,095 40,424 41,357 37,083 37,912 -3.14
LOB,SBrok 226,132 192,369 241,830 206,178 162,250 174,533 -17.77
SpCross 4,720,805 3,999,936 4,232,458 4,300,275 3,889,475 4,995,728 1.79
 
This table shows the difference (diff (%)) in traded value between pre-event and post-event 1. 
Post-event 1 refers to the months including 200512-200602. Pre-event refers to the months 
including 200509-200511. Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 
represents stocks with the smallest market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with 
the largest market capitalization. Comparison of the difference in traded value between the 
pre- and post-period is measured in percentage. A positive signed difference shows that there 
is an increase in traded value in post-event 1; a negatively signed difference shows that there 
is a decline in the traded value in post-event 1.  
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TABLE 5: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR TRADED VALUE:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 1 (by quintiles and trade types) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 6,918 11,850 287,199 7,140 14,140 293,440 (4.60)*** (0.0005)***
LOB,SBrok 20,664 112,397 30,551 24,828 182,782 30,304 (2.46)** 0.4727
SpCross 3,090,383 2,887,785 84 2,514,746 2,240,278 54 -0.93 (0.0191)**
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 7,656 13,260 654,709 7,172 13,521 681,272 (-14.76) *** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 27,217 144,858 59,761 27,237 225,412 56,858 0.01 (<.0001)***
SpCross 2,680,265 4,662,486 130 4,426,497 8,078,268 116 1.51 0.6725
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 9,877 21,159 922,901 9,282 23,295 1,041,400 (-13.27)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 74,209 387,555 73,863 56,336 282,212 75,794 (-7.29)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 3,128,317 5,781,570 450 3,607,216 8,391,047 388 0.69 0.7581
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 14,172 33,362 1,232,088 13,932 35,218 1,551,788 (-4.10)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 123,235 1,560,460 101,177 98,866 446,579 119,859 (-3.93)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 3,285,755 4,096,544 1,019 3,646,736 13,800,896 1,122 0.67 0.0682
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 40,000 132,061 5,355,434 38,666 184,280 5,767,527 (-9.97)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 216,691 1,647,689 400,989 183,592 2,235,332 419,202 (-5.47)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 4,361,056 8,642,638 9,681 4,451,268 12,865,298 7,955 0.39 0.0923
 
This table shows the mean traded value for the pre-event and post-event 1. Post-event 1 refers to the 
months including 200512-200602. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. Stocks 
are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with the smallest market 
capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market capitalization. The t-test and 
Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in means between the two periods. ***, **, and * 
denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 6: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR TRADED VALUE:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 1 (by trade types only) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N Diff (%) t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
LOB,DBrok 29,316 107,145 8,452,331 27,987 146,473 9,335,427 -4.53 (-15.67)***  (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 160,726 1,424,086 666,341 135,870 1,742,326 702,017 -15.46 (-6.50)***  (<.0001)***
SpCross 4,187,200 8,181,797 11,364 4,312,439 12,749,739 9,635 2.99 0.61 0.6239  
 
This table shows the mean traded value for the pre-event and post-event 1. Post-event 1 refers to the 
months including 200512-200602. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. Stocks 
are grouped by trade types only. The t-test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in 
means between the two periods. ***, **, and * denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 7: TRADED VALUE FOR PRE AND POST EVENT 2 (MILLION AUD) 
 
 
200509 200510 200511 200603 200604 200605 Diff (%)
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 7,144 7,151 6,404 7,557 7,642 7,577 10.03
LOB,SBrok 22,326 21,217 18,226 34,440 23,121 30,466 42.51
SpCross 3,831,768 2,825,310 1,939,753 3,533,763 2,116,708 1,541,635 -16.34
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 7,842 7,994 7,063 7,911 8,335 7,311 2.87
LOB,SBrok 31,334 24,610 26,158 30,134 35,005 34,893 21.84
SpCross 3,252,470 2,439,704 2,321,579 2,850,908 4,570,331 7,132,924 81.61
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 10,784 9,667 9,150 10,155 8,983 8,833 -5.51
LOB,SBrok 85,215 70,839 66,332 77,186 53,826 59,603 -14.29
SpCross 4,106,231 2,499,006 2,144,567 4,766,992 2,412,501 2,809,804 14.17
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 14,646 14,312 13,518 16,344 13,293 13,466 1.48
LOB,SBrok 137,932 112,018 119,467 112,164 90,969 110,223 -15.18
SpCross 3,276,813 2,836,738 3,752,572 4,508,997 2,980,824 5,150,462 28.12
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 41,607 38,095 40,241 38,863 36,224 35,851 -7.51
LOB,SBrok 226,132 192,369 232,670 189,458 181,264 190,983 -13.74
SpCross 4,720,805 3,999,936 4,220,931 5,229,736 4,977,435 4,567,832 14.17  
 
This table shows the difference (diff (%)) in traded value between pre-event and post-event 2. Post-
event 2 refers to the months including 200603-200605. Pre-event refers to the months including 
200509-200511. Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with 
the smallest market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market 
capitalization. Comparison of the difference in traded value between the pre- and post-period is 
measured in percentage. A positive signed difference shows that there is an increase in traded value 
in post-event 2; a negatively signed difference shows that there is a decline in the traded value in 
post-event 2.  
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TABLE 8: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR TRADED VALUE:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 2 (by quintiles and trade types) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 6,918 11,850 287,199 7,588 17,699 322,809 (12.57)***  (<.0001)***  
LOB,SBrok 20,664 112,397 30,551 29,824 186,725 32,757 (5.47)*** 0.1964
SpCross 3,090,383 2,887,785 84 2,729,025 2,376,425 103 -0.66 0.2026
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 7,656 13,260 654,709 7,810 19,302 822,245 (4.09)*** (<.0001)*** 
LOB,SBrok 27,217 144,858 59,761 33,292 194,340 65,319 (4.49)*** (<.0001)*** 
SpCross 2,680,265 4,662,486 130 4,867,295 11,534,728 185 (1.74)* (<.0001)*** 
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 9,877 21,159 922,901 9,325 21,088 1,282,076 (-13.57)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 74,209 387,555 73,863 63,911 362,947 97,741 (-3.98)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 3,128,317 5,781,570 450 3,473,897 5,639,552 524 0.67 0.3553
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 14,172 33,362 1,232,088 14,408 39,681 2,000,420 (4.06)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 123,235 1,560,460 101,177 105,520 569,153 156,871 (-2.79)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 3,285,755 4,096,544 1,019 4,315,007 13,896,108 1,232 (1.96)* 0.4802
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 40,000 132,061 5,355,434 36,920 135,249 7,309,287 (-28.75)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 216,691 1,647,689 400,989 187,705 1,347,088 518,358 (-6.48)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 4,361,056 8,642,638 9,681 4,926,545 9,589,287 9,720 (3.05)*** (0.0014)***  
 
This table shows the mean traded value for the pre-event and post-event 2. Post-event 2 refers to the 
months including 200603-200605. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. Stocks 
are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with the smallest market 
capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market capitalization. The t-test and 
Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in means between the two periods. ***, **, and * 
denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 9: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR TRADED VALUE:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 2 (by trade types only) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N Diff (%) t-statistic Wicoxon p-value
LOB,DBrok 29,316 107,145 8,452,331 27,223 109,096 11,736,837 -7.14 (-30.47)*** ( <.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 160,726 1,424,086 666,341 141,496 1,077,350 871,046 -11.96 (-6.63)*** (<.0001)*** 
SpCross 4,187,200 8,181,797 11,364 4,777,624 9,994,081 11,764 14.10 (3.50)*** (0.0011)**
 
 
This table shows the mean traded value for the pre-event and post-event 2. Post-event 2 refers to the 
months including 200603-200605. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. Stocks 
are grouped by trade types only. The t-test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in 
means between the two periods. ***, **, and * denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 10: TRADED VALUE FOR PRE AND POST EVENT 3 (MILLION AUD) 
 
200509 200510 200511 200606 200607 200608 Diff(%)
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 7,144 7,151 6,404 6,364 6,578 6,927 -4.01
LOB,SBrok 22,326 21,217 18,226 21,365 32,812 33,431 41.83
SpCross 3,831,768 2,825,310 1,939,753 2,072,745 2,222,611 2,684,303 -18.81
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 7,842 7,994 7,063 6,681 5,450 6,174 -20.06
LOB,SBrok 31,334 24,610 26,158 39,444 27,249 32,584 20.92
SpCross 3,252,470 2,439,704 2,321,579 3,431,555 2,829,146 2,736,325 12.27
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 10,784 9,667 9,150 9,267 7,433 8,892 -13.55
LOB,SBrok 85,215 70,839 66,332 60,977 58,599 53,629 -22.11
SpCross 4,106,231 2,499,006 2,144,567 4,080,239 2,994,131 3,008,348 15.23
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 14,646 14,312 13,518 14,074 10,702 11,374 -14.89
LOB,SBrok 137,932 112,018 119,467 92,784 86,552 89,200 -27.31
SpCross 3,276,813 2,836,738 3,752,572 3,681,686 3,663,048 3,202,297 6.90
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 41,607 38,095 40,241 37,103 30,690 33,291 -15.72
LOB,SBrok 226,132 192,369 232,670 164,833 150,145 163,502 -26.52
SpCross 4,720,805 3,999,936 4,220,931 4,610,532 4,308,251 4,961,895 7.26  
 
This table shows the difference (diff (%)) in traded value between pre-event and post-event 3. Post-
event 3 refers to the months including 200606-200608. Pre-event refers to the months including 
200509-200511. Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with 
the smallest market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market 
capitalization. Comparison of the difference in traded value between the pre- and post-period is 
measured in percentage. A positive signed difference shows that there is an increase in traded value 
in post-event 3; a negatively signed difference shows that there is a decline in the traded value in 
post-event 3.  
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TABLE 11: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR TRADED VALUE:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 3 (by quintiles and trade types) 
 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 6,918 11,850 287,199 6,621 13,357 303,251 (-6.40)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 20,664 112,397 30,551 28,550 177,829 28,804 (4.66)*** 0.2612
SpCross 3,090,383 2,887,785 84 2,276,952 1,323,563 50 -1.62 0.2379
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 7,656 13,260 654,709 6,092 23,847 793,980 (-36.24)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 27,217 144,858 59,761 33,119 313,830 53,237 (3.02)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 2,680,265 4,662,486 130 3,000,133 3,827,719 123 0.42 0.9008
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 9,877 21,159 922,901 8,490 106,320 1,582,097 (-13.02)*** (<.0001)***    
LOB,SBrok 74,209 387,555 73,863 57,576 414,579 117,355 (-6.31)*** (<.0001)***    
SpCross 3,128,317 5,781,570 450 3,328,446 6,468,639 523 0.36 0.7346
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 14,172 33,362 1,232,088 11,997 34,805 2,195,394 (-40.60)*** (<.0001 )***  
LOB,SBrok 123,235 1,560,460 101,177 89,486 455,467 169,805 (-5.61)*** (<.0001 )***  
SpCross 3,285,755 4,096,544 1,019 3,485,715 4,894,057 1,102 0.73 0.9414
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 40,000 132,061 5,355,434 33,755 140,522 7,694,256 (-57.97)*** (<.0001)*** 
LOB,SBrok 216,691 1,647,689 400,989 159,759 1,817,128 556,667 (-11.30)*** (<.0001)*** 
SpCross 4,361,056 8,642,638 9,681 4,660,407 14,682,089 9,795 1.27 0.9872  
 
This table shows the mean traded value for the pre-event and post-event 3. Post-event 3 refers to the 
months including 200606-200608. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. Stocks 
are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with the smallest market 
capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market capitalization. The t-test and 
Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in means between the two periods. ***, **, and * 
denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 12: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR TRADED VALUE:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 3 (by trade types only) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N Diff (%) t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
LOB,DBrok 29,316 107,145 8,452,331 24,372 117,914 12,568,978 -16.86 (-70.51)*** (<.0001 )***
LOB,SBrok 160,726 1,424,086 666,341 122,555 1,433,193 925,868 -23.75 (-11.80)***  (<.0001)***
SpCross 4,187,200 8,181,797 11,364 4,460,759 13,662,877 11,593 6.53 1.34 0.9804  
 
This table shows the mean traded value for the pre-event and post-event 3. Post-event 3 refers to the 
months including 200606-200608. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. Stocks 
are grouped by trade types only. The t-test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in 
means between the two periods. ***, **, and * denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 13: EFFECTIVE SPREADS FOR PRE AND POST EVENT 1  
 
200509 200510 200511 200512 200601 200602 Diff (%)
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 0.0042 0.0108 0.0042 0.0052 0.0046 0.0050 -23.16
LOB,SBrok 0.0100 0.0106 0.0112 0.0088 0.0117 0.0507 124.51
SpCross 0.0558 0.0254 0.0265 0.0157 0.0113 0.0621 -17.32
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 0.0065 0.0070 0.0063 0.0079 0.0067 0.0067 7.18
LOB,SBrok 0.0177 0.0178 0.0155 0.0193 0.0129 0.0136 -10.24
SpCross 0.0436 0.0440 0.0379 0.0614 0.0243 0.0588 15.14
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 0.0075 0.0074 0.0069 0.0097 0.0068 0.0074 9.65
LOB,SBrok 0.0160 0.0437 0.0186 0.0249 0.5210 0.0406 649.00
SpCross 1.3152 0.0295 0.0286 0.0267 0.0958 0.0349 -88.54
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 0.0130 0.0163 0.0157 0.0171 0.0165 0.0146 6.90
LOB,SBrok 0.0262 0.0639 0.0505 0.0279 0.8449 0.0278 540.59
SpCross 0.1013 0.1707 0.0384 0.4251 0.0290 0.0420 59.83
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 0.0422 0.0418 0.0479 0.0744 0.0426 0.0634 36.78
LOB,SBrok 0.0791 0.0969 0.1125 0.1757 0.5927 0.1340 212.82
SpCross 2.0759 0.2559 0.0857 1.7182 0.1188 0.1497 -17.82  
 
This table shows the difference (diff (%)) in effective spreads between pre-event and post-event 1. 
Post-event 1 refers to the months including 200512-200602. Pre-event refers to the months 
including 200509-200511. Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents 
stocks with the smallest market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest 
market capitalization. Comparison of the difference in effective spreads between the pre- and post-
period is measured in percentage. A positive signed difference shows that there is an increase in 
effective spreads in post-event 1; a negatively signed difference shows that there is a decline in the 
effective spreads in post-event 1.  
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TABLE 14: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR EFFECTIVE SPREADS:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 1 (by quintiles and trade types) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 0.0065 0.6448 287,199 0.0049 0.0195 293,440 -1.31 (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 0.0106 0.1032 30,548 0.0253 1.5146 30,304 1.58 (0.0004)***
SpCross 0.0420 0.0444 84 0.0350 0.0674 54 -0.50 (0.0075)***
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 0.0066 0.0403 654,709 0.0070 0.1222 681,272 (1.70)* (<.0001 )***
LOB,SBrok 0.0171 0.2722 59,761 0.0148 0.2201 56,858 -1.13 (<.0001)***
SpCross 0.0421 0.0574 130 0.0486 0.0933 116 0.48 0.8386
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 0.0073 0.0568 922,901 0.0078 0.1289 1,041,400 (2.56)**  (<.0001)***  
LOB,SBrok 0.0259 1.0507 73,863 0.1893 10.4509 75,794 (3.91)***  (<.0001)***  
SpCross 0.6050 6.1249 450 0.0477 0.3097 388 (-1.83)* 0.4948
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 0.0150 0.3584 1,232,071 0.0158 0.4811 1,551,784 1.23  (<.0001)***  
LOB,SBrok 0.0461 1.7905 101,174 0.2879 17.8182 119,857 (4.24)***  (<.0001)***  
SpCross 0.1032 0.6492 1,019 0.1513 3.5368 1,122 0.38 (0.0006)***
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 0.0444 0.9212 5,355,421 0.0587 1.0818 5,767,488 (16.80)***  (<.0001)***  
LOB,SBrok 0.0970 2.2997 400,989 0.2906 13.5165 419,200 (7.90)***  (<.0001)***  
SpCross 0.9273 30.1324 9,681 0.5001 18.3117 7,955 -0.83  (<.0001)***   
 
This table shows the mean effective spreads for the pre-event and post-event 1. Post-event 1 refers 
to the months including 200512-200602. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. 
Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with the smallest 
market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market capitalization. The t-
test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in means between the two periods. ***, **, 
and * denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 15: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR EFFECTIVE SPREADS:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 1 (by trade types only) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N Diff (%) t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
LOB,DBrok 0.0318 0.7558 8,452,301 0.0404 0.8747 9,335,384 26.86 (15.66)*** (<.0001 )***
LOB,SBrok 0.0703 1.9494 666,335 0.2454 13.2364 702,013 249.20 (9.63)*** (<.0001 )***
SpCross 0.8239 27.8401 11,364 0.4332 16.6831 9,635 -47.42 -0.91 (<.0001 )***  
 
This table shows the mean effective spreads for the pre-event and post-event 1 by. Post-event 1 
refers to the months including 200512-200602. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-
200511. Stocks are grouped by trade types only. The t-test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for the 
difference in means between the two periods. ***, **, and * denotes significance in difference of 
means at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 16: EFFECTIVE SPREADS FOR PRE AND POST EVENT 2  
 
200509 200510 200511 200603 200604 200605 Diff (%)
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 0.0042 0.0108 0.0043 0.0078 0.0051 0.0049 -8.02
LOB,SBrok 0.0100 0.0106 0.0114 0.2010 0.0155 0.0228 648.36
SpCross 0.0558 0.0254 0.0265 0.1398 0.0197 0.0181 64.95
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 0.0065 0.0070 0.0064 0.0084 0.0073 0.0075 16.40
LOB,SBrok 0.0177 0.0178 0.0157 0.0209 0.0124 0.0337 30.83
SpCross 0.0436 0.0440 0.0379 0.0509 0.0412 0.0325 -0.71
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 0.0075 0.0074 0.0069 0.0079 0.0086 0.0084 13.44
LOB,SBrok 0.0160 0.0437 0.0166 0.0168 0.0203 0.0546 20.34
SpCross 1.3152 0.0295 0.0230 0.4293 0.0309 0.2281 -49.68
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 0.0130 0.0163 0.0158 0.0438 0.0140 0.0181 68.81
LOB,SBrok 0.0262 0.0639 0.0484 0.0495 0.0367 0.3465 212.30
SpCross 0.1013 0.1707 0.0368 0.1350 0.0483 0.4816 115.27
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 0.0422 0.0418 0.0498 0.0488 0.0497 0.0498 10.74
LOB,SBrok 0.0791 0.0969 0.1187 0.0960 0.1056 0.2813 63.89
SpCross 2.0759 0.2559 0.0864 0.1120 0.6572 0.2504 -57.84  
 
This table shows the difference (diff (%)) in effective spreads between pre-event and post-event 2. 
Post-event 2 refers to the months including 200603-200605. Pre-event refers to the months 
including 200509-200511. Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents 
stocks with the smallest market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest 
market capitalization. Comparison of the difference in effective spreads between the pre- and post-
period is measured in percentage. A positive signed difference shows that there is an increase in 
effective spreads in post-event 2; a negatively signed difference shows that there is a decline in the 
effective spreads in post-event 2.  
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TABLE 17: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR EFFECTIVE SPREADS:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 2 (by quintiles and trade types) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 0.0065 0.6448 287,199 0.0060 0.3305 322,809 -0.29   (<.0001  )***
LOB,SBrok 0.0106 0.1032 30,548 0.0828 5.0968 32,757 (2.51)** (0.0007)***
SpCross 0.0420 0.0444 84 0.0789 0.3336 103 0.98 (0.0008)***
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 0.0066 0.0403 654,709 0.0077 0.2970 822,245 (2.87)*** (<.0001  )***
LOB,SBrok 0.0171 0.2722 59,761 0.0230 0.9968 65,317 1.17 (<.0001  )***
SpCross 0.0421 0.0574 130 0.0413 0.0622 185 -0.08 0.6995
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 0.0073 0.0568 922,901 0.0083 0.1858 1,282,073 (4.32)***   (<.0001 )***
LOB,SBrok 0.0259 1.0507 73,863 0.0318 2.2136 97,741 0.54   (<.0001 )***
SpCross 0.6050 6.1249 450 0.2564 3.7255 524 -0.77 0.4482
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 0.0150 0.3584 1,232,071 0.0258 1.2744 2,000,381 (8.88)***   (<.0001 )***
LOB,SBrok 0.0461 1.7905 101,174 0.1555 10.8236 156,864 (3.32)***   (<.0001 )***
SpCross 0.1032 0.6492 1,019 0.2209 2.1485 1,232 1.44 (0.0036)***
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 0.0444 0.9212 5,355,421 0.0494 0.8023 7,309,284 (7.25)***   (<.0001 )***
LOB,SBrok 0.0970 2.2997 400,989 0.1679 9.6647 518,358 (4.16)***   (<.0001 )***
SpCross 0.9273 30.1324 9,681 0.3268 10.3969 9,720 -1.46   (<.0001 )***  
 
This table shows the mean effective spreads for the pre-event and post-event 2. Post-event 2 refers 
to the months including 200603-200605. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. 
Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with the smallest 
market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market capitalization. The t-
test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in means between the two periods. ***, **, 
and * denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 18: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR EFFECTIVE SPREADS:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 2 (by trade types only) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N Diff (%) t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
LOB,DBrok 0.0318 0.7558 8,452,301 0.0368 0.8312 11,736,792 15.55 (9.85)*** (0.0963)*
LOB,SBrok 0.0703 1.9494 666,335 0.1363 8.8480 871,037 93.99 (5.57)***  (<.0001 )***
SpCross 0.8239 27.8401 11,364 0.3059 9.5088 11,764 -62.87 -1.48 (<.0001 )***  
 
This table shows the mean effective spreads for the pre-event and post-event 2. Post-event 2 refers 
to the months including 200603-200605. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. 
Stocks are grouped by trade types only. The t-test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for the 
difference in means between the two periods. ***, **, and * denotes significance in difference of 
means at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 19: EFFECTIVE SPREADS FOR PRE AND POST EVENT 3 
 
200509 200510 200511 200606 200607 200608 Diff (%)
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 0.0042 0.0108 0.0043 0.0105 0.0056 0.0047 7.88
LOB,SBrok 0.0100 0.0106 0.0114 0.0103 0.0377 0.0113 85.36
SpCross 0.0558 0.0254 0.0265 0.0400 0.0636 0.0171 12.14
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 0.0065 0.0070 0.0064 0.0076 0.0055 0.0058 -4.84
LOB,SBrok 0.0177 0.0178 0.0157 0.0306 0.0137 0.0172 20.18
SpCross 0.0436 0.0440 0.0379 0.0712 0.0351 0.0457 21.11
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 0.0075 0.0074 0.0069 0.0120 0.0069 0.0062 14.85
LOB,SBrok 0.0160 0.0437 0.0166 0.0326 0.0214 0.0196 -3.54
SpCross 1.3152 0.0295 0.0230 0.6030 0.7855 0.1235 10.55
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 0.0130 0.0163 0.0158 0.0176 0.0137 0.0125 -2.67
LOB,SBrok 0.0262 0.0639 0.0484 0.0367 0.0738 0.0326 3.30
SpCross 0.1013 0.1707 0.0368 0.1969 0.0501 0.2115 48.43
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 0.0422 0.0418 0.0498 0.0663 0.0443 0.0410 13.22
LOB,SBrok 0.0791 0.0969 0.1187 0.1538 0.0922 0.0888 13.61
SpCross 2.0759 0.2559 0.0864 0.1884 0.3952 0.3170 -62.76  
 
 
This table shows the difference (diff (%)) in effective spreads between pre-event and post-event 3. 
Post-event 3 refers to the months including 200606-200608. Pre-event refers to the months 
including 200509-200511. Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents 
stocks with the smallest market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest 
market capitalization. Comparison of the difference in effective spreads between the pre- and post-
period is measured in percentage.  A positive signed difference shows that there is an increase in 
effective spreads in post-event 3; a negatively signed difference shows that there is a decline in the 
effective spreads in post-event 3.  
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TABLE 20: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR EFFECTIVE SPREADS: PRE AND POST 
EVENT 3 (by quintiles and trade types) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 0.0065 0.6448 287,199 0.0069 0.5136 303,251 0.2 (0.0008)***
LOB,SBrok 0.0106 0.1032 30,548 0.0185 1.1340 28,804 1.08 0.3262
SpCross 0.0420 0.0444 84 0.0388 0.1104 50 -0.16 (0.0002)***
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 0.0066 0.0403 654,709 0.0063 0.0855 793,980 (-2.48)** (<.0001 )***
LOB,SBrok 0.0171 0.2722 59,761 0.0206 0.4412 53,237 1.13 (<.0001 )***
SpCross 0.0421 0.0574 130 0.0514 0.0968 123 0.68 0.5813
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 0.0073 0.0568 922,901 0.0082 0.5288 1,582,097 (1.82)* (<.0001 )***
LOB,SBrok 0.0259 1.0507 73,863 0.0241 0.7495 117,355 -0.3 (<.0001 )***
SpCross 0.6050 6.1249 450 0.4418 4.9674 523 -0.32 0.8425
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 0.0150 0.3584 1,232,071 0.0145 0.3739 2,195,349 -0.84 (<.0001 )***
LOB,SBrok 0.0461 1.7905 101,174 0.0472 4.3865 169,797 0.07 (<.0001 )***
SpCross 0.1032 0.6492 1,019 0.1564 1.2044 1,102 0.94 (0.0856)*
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 0.0444 0.9212 5,355,421 0.0506 0.8927 7,694,229 (8.58)*** (<.0001 )***
LOB,SBrok 0.0970 2.2997 400,989 0.1114 1.9123 556,660 (2.32)** (<.0001 )***
SpCross 0.9273 30.1324 9,681 0.2965 3.8877 9,795 (-1.83)* (<.0001 )***  
 
This table shows the mean effective spreads for the pre-event and post-event 3. Post-event 3 refers 
to the months including 200606-200608. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. 
Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with the smallest 
market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market capitalization. The t-
test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in means between the two periods. ***, **, 
and * denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 21: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR EFFECTIVE SPREADS:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 3 (by trade types only) 
 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N Diff (%) t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
LOB,DBrok 0.0318 0.7558 8,452,301 0.0351 0.7448 12,568,906 10.16 (6.89)***  (<.0001  )*** 
LOB,SBrok 0.0703 1.9494 666,335 0.0804 2.4189 925,853 14.43 (2.07)**  (<.0001  )*** 
SpCross 0.8239 27.8401 11,364 0.2860 3.7447 11,593 -65.28 (-1.82)*  (<.0001  )***  
 
This table shows the mean effective spreads for the pre-event and post-event 3. Post-event 3 refers 
to the months including 200606-200608. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. 
Stocks are grouped by trade types only. The t-test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for the 
difference in means between the two periods. ***, **, and * denotes significance in difference of 
means at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 22: VOLATILITY FOR PRE AND POST EVENT 1 
 
200509 200510 200511 200512 200601 200602 Diff (%)
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 2.778 2.769 2.915 3.012 2.953 2.982 5.73
LOB,SBrok 2.750 2.758 2.920 2.994 2.944 2.973 5.73
SpCross 2.743 2.643 2.867 2.816 2.871 2.957 4.72
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 2.804 2.757 2.911 2.967 2.942 3.031 5.52
LOB,SBrok 2.796 2.749 2.916 2.981 2.938 3.027 5.73
SpCross 2.848 2.732 2.797 2.915 3.135 3.229 10.77
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 2.803 2.780 2.902 2.961 2.947 3.062 5.73
LOB,SBrok 2.792 2.785 2.905 2.953 2.942 3.038 5.31
SpCross 2.782 2.851 2.860 3.145 2.881 2.968 5.91
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 2.785 2.773 2.908 2.976 2.956 3.057 6.18
LOB,SBrok 2.787 2.771 2.913 2.986 2.956 3.033 5.96
SpCross 2.765 2.767 2.866 3.076 2.955 2.999 7.53
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 2.786 2.776 2.911 2.980 2.957 3.039 5.94
LOB,SBrok 2.791 2.775 2.915 2.988 2.957 3.039 5.93
SpCross 2.812 2.761 2.851 2.976 2.948 3.039 6.38  
 
This table shows the difference (diff (%)) in volatility between pre-event and post-event 1. Post-
event 1 refers to the months including 200512-200602. Pre-event refers to the months including 
200509-200511. Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with 
the smallest market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market 
capitalization. Comparison of the difference in volatility between the pre- and post-period is 
measured in percentage. A positive signed difference shows that there is an increase in volatility in 
post-event 1; a negatively signed difference shows that there is a decline in the volatility in post-
event 1.  
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TABLE 23: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR VOLATILITY:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 1 (by quintiles and trade types) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 2.820 0.399 287,199 2.977 0.397 288,137 (105.72)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.809 0.391 30,551 2.966 0.387 29,755 (35.04)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 2.766 0.365 84 2.895 0.278 54 (1.66)* (<.0001)***
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 2.822 0.397 654,709 2.978 0.404 669,306 (158.53)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.816 0.395 59,761 2.980 0.404 55,697 (49.32)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 2.790 0.346 130 3.099 0.509 116 (3.98)*** (<.0001)***
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 2.829 0.400 922,901 2.992 0.414 1,021,411 (196.34)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.827 0.400 73,863 2.978 0.400 74,309 (51.43)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 2.823 0.381 450 2.991 0.404 375 (4.32)*** (<.0001)***
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 2.823 0.399 1,232,088 2.997 0.421 1,518,875 (247.60)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.825 0.401 101,177 2.989 0.411 117,341 (66.75)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 2.799 0.365 1,019 3.004 0.416 1,104 (8.59)*** (<.0001)***
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 2.823 0.402 5,355,434 2.990 0.414 5,652,854 (479.96)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.826 0.405 400,989 2.992 0.413 410,294 (129.12)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 2.812 0.370 9,681 2.985 0.404 7,815 (20.77)*** (<.0001)***  
 
This table shows the mean traded value for the pre-event and post-event 1. Post-event 1 refers to the 
months including 200512-200602. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. Stocks 
are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with the smallest market 
capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market capitalization. The t-test and 
Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in means between the two periods. ***, **, and * 
denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 24: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR VOLATILITY:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 1 (by trade types only) 
 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N Diff (%) t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
LOB,DBrok 2.8236 0.4011 8,452,331 2.9901 0.4142 9,150,583 5.90 (605.83)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.8241 0.4021 666,341 2.9877 0.4096 687,396 5.79 (165.75)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 2.8107 0.3696 11,364 2.9884 0.4067 9,464 6.33 (23.25)*** (<.0001)***  
 
This table shows the mean traded value for the pre-event and post-event 1. Post-event 1 refers to the 
months including 200512-200602. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. Stocks 
are grouped by trade types only. The t-test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in 
means between the two periods. ***, **, and * denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 25: VOLATILITY FOR PRE AND POST EVENT 2 
 
200509 200510 200511 200603 200604 200605 Diff(%)
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 2.7784 2.7689 2.9233 2.9851 3.1354 3.1741 9.73
LOB,SBrok 2.7502 2.7581 2.9282 2.9813 3.1384 3.1752 10.17
SpCross 2.7435 2.6433 2.8671 2.9987 3.1243 2.9936 10.45
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 2.8041 2.7574 2.9180 2.9953 3.1653 3.1798 10.15
LOB,SBrok 2.7956 2.7495 2.9235 2.9950 3.1540 3.1624 9.95
SpCross 2.8477 2.7322 2.7972 3.0078 3.0795 3.1313 10.05
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 2.8026 2.7796 2.9083 3.0012 3.1579 3.1991 10.22
LOB,SBrok 2.7919 2.7845 2.9115 2.9970 3.1594 3.1892 10.10
SpCross 2.7816 2.8506 2.8635 2.9827 3.0902 3.2663 9.93
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 2.7846 2.7734 2.9154 3.0077 3.1537 3.1876 10.33
LOB,SBrok 2.7866 2.7713 2.9217 3.0158 3.1499 3.1930 10.37
SpCross 2.7646 2.7672 2.8711 2.9906 3.2768 3.1706 12.32
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 2.7860 2.7756 2.9193 3.0024 3.1730 3.1856 10.38
LOB,SBrok 2.7912 2.7748 2.9247 3.0034 3.1702 3.1921 10.31
SpCross 2.8123 2.7608 2.8534 3.0054 3.1829 3.1864 11.25  
 
This table shows the difference (diff (%)) in volatility between pre-event and post-event 2. Post-
event 2 refers to the months including 200603-200605. Pre-event refers to the months including 
200509-200511. Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with 
the smallest market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market 
capitalization. Comparison of the difference in volatility between the pre- and post-period is 
measured in percentage. A positive signed difference shows that there is an increase in volatility in 
post-event 2; a negatively signed difference shows that there is a decline in the volatility in post-
event 2.  
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TABLE 26: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR VOLATILITY:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 2 (by quintiles and trade types) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 2.820 0.399 287,199 3.094 0.384 322,809 (193.26)*** ( <.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.809 0.391 30,551 3.098 0.385 32,757 (66.17)*** ( <.0001)***
SpCross 2.766 0.365 84 3.042 0.398 103 (3.49)*** ( <.0001)***
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 2.822 0.397 654,709 3.113 0.396 822,245 (313.09)*** ( <.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.816 0.395 59,761 3.102 0.392 65,319 (91.07)*** ( <.0001)***
SpCross 2.790 0.346 130 3.075 0.378 185 (4.90)*** ( <.0001)***
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 2.829 0.400 922,901 3.120 0.404 1,282,076 (375.58)*** ( <.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.827 0.400 73,863 3.115 0.396 97,741 (105.23)*** ( <.0001)***
SpCross 2.823 0.381 450 3.110 0.411 524 (8.00)*** ( <.0001)***
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 2.823 0.399 1,232,088 3.116 0.399 2,000,420 (456.74)*** ( <.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.825 0.401 101,177 3.119 0.397 156,871 (129.82)*** ( <.0001)***
SpCross 2.799 0.365 1,019 3.121 0.433 1,232 (13.55)*** ( <.0001)***
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 2.823 0.402 5,355,434 3.123 0.407 7,309,287 (926.19)*** ( <.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.826 0.405 400,989 3.121 0.408 518,358 (245.06)*** ( <.0001)***
SpCross 2.812 0.370 9,681 3.122 0.417 9,720 (38.74)*** ( <.0001)***  
 
This table shows the mean traded value for the pre-event and post-event 2. Post-event 2 refers to the 
months including 200603-200605. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. Stocks 
are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with the smallest market 
capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market capitalization. The t-test and 
Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in means between the two periods. ***, **, and * 
denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 27: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR VOLATILITY:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 2 (by trade types only) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N Diff (%) t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
LOB,DBrok 2.824 0.401 8,452,331 3.120 0.404 11,736,837 10.51 (1159.57)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.824 0.402 666,341 3.118 0.402 871,046 10.40 (317.84)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 2.811 0.370 11,364 3.120 0.418 11,764 10.99 (42.20)*** (<.0001)***  
 
This table shows the mean traded value for the pre-event and post-event 2. Post-event 2 refers to the 
months including 200603-200605. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. Stocks 
are grouped by trade types only. The t-test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in 
means between the two periods. ***, **, and * denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 28: VOLATILITY FOR PRE AND POST EVENT 3 
 
200509 200510 200511 200606 200607 200608 Diff  (%)
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 2.778 2.769 2.923 3.368 3.310 3.344 18.31
LOB,SBrok 2.750 2.758 2.928 3.388 3.302 3.347 18.97
SpCross 2.743 2.643 2.867 3.567 3.206 3.327 22.37
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 2.804 2.757 2.918 3.346 3.362 3.341 18.51
LOB,SBrok 2.796 2.749 2.923 3.360 3.324 3.338 18.34
SpCross 2.848 2.732 2.797 3.512 3.827 3.312 27.14
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 2.803 2.780 2.908 3.351 3.354 3.340 18.32
LOB,SBrok 2.792 2.785 2.912 3.354 3.361 3.341 18.48
SpCross 2.782 2.851 2.863 3.347 3.290 3.350 17.56
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 2.785 2.773 2.915 3.347 3.354 3.346 18.57
LOB,SBrok 2.787 2.771 2.922 3.342 3.372 3.347 18.65
SpCross 2.765 2.767 2.871 3.341 3.366 3.345 19.61
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 2.786 2.776 2.919 3.358 3.334 3.344 18.33
LOB,SBrok 2.791 2.775 2.925 3.361 3.358 3.341 18.49
SpCross 2.812 2.761 2.853 3.368 3.293 3.342 18.70  
 
This table shows the difference (diff (%)) in volatility between pre-event and post-event 3. Post-
event 3 refers to the months including 200606-200608. Pre-event refers to the months including 
200509-200511. Stocks are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with 
the smallest market capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market 
capitalization. Comparison of the difference in volatility between the pre- and post-period is 
measured in percentage. A positive signed difference shows that there is an increase in volatility in 
post-event 3; a negatively signed difference shows that there is a decline in the volatility in post-
event 3. 
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TABLE 29: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR VOLATILITY:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 3 (by quintiles and trade types) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
QUINTILE 1
LOB,DBrok 2.820 0.399 287,199 3.341 0.284 294,434 (411.45)***  (<.0001   )***
LOB,SBrok 2.809 0.391 30,551 3.351 0.272 27,916 (140.33)***  (<.0001   )***
SpCross 2.766 0.365 84 3.420 0.278 50 (8.26)***  (<.0001   )***
QUINTILE 2
LOB,DBrok 2.822 0.397 654,709 3.350 0.310 771,305 (625.63)***  (<.0001 )***
LOB,SBrok 2.816 0.395 59,761 3.341 0.287 51,829 (182.57)***  (<.0001 )***
SpCross 2.790 0.346 130 3.527 0.520 123 (9.53)***  (<.0001 )***
QUINTILE 3
LOB,DBrok 2.829 0.400 922,901 3.349 0.307 1,535,626 (781.36)***  (<.0001  )***
LOB,SBrok 2.827 0.400 73,863 3.352 0.316 114,031 (218.18)***  (<.0001  )***
SpCross 2.823 0.381 450 3.334 0.270 513 (17.09)***  (<.0001  )***
QUINTILE 4
LOB,DBrok 2.823 0.399 1,232,088 3.349 0.297 2,127,123 (932.38)*** ( <.0001 )***
LOB,SBrok 2.825 0.401 101,177 3.353 0.312 164,560 (260.09)*** ( <.0001 )***
SpCross 2.799 0.365 1,019 3.350 0.307 1,073 (26.53)*** ( <.0001 )***
QUINTILE 5
LOB,DBrok 2.823 0.402 5,355,434 3.345 0.292 7,450,065 (1860.67)*** (<.0001)***
LOB,SBrok 2.826 0.405 400,989 3.353 0.306 538,467 (499.43)*** (<.0001)***
SpCross 2.812 0.370 9,681 3.337 0.266 9,485 (80.86)*** (<.0001)***
  
 
This table shows the mean traded value for the pre-event and post-event 3. Post-event 3 refers to the 
months including 200606-200608. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. Stocks 
are grouped by quintiles and trade types. Quintile 1 represents stocks with the smallest market 
capitalization and Quintile 5 represents stocks with the largest market capitalization. The t-test and 
Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in means between the two periods. ***, **, and * 
denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 30: T-TEST & WILCOXON TEST FOR VOLATILITY:  
PRE AND POST EVENT 3  (by trade types only) 
 
Pre-event Pre-stdev Pre N Post-event Post-stdev Post N Diff (%) t-statistic Wilcoxon p-value
LOB,DBrok 2.824 0.401 8,452,331 3.347 0.296 12,178,553 18.52 (2348.30)*** (<.0001  )***
LOB,SBrok 2.824 0.402 666,341 3.352 0.307 896,803 18.70 (647.14)*** (<.0001  )***
SpCross 2.811 0.370 11,364 3.340 0.275 11,244 18.85 (87.41)*** (<.0001  )***  
This table shows the mean traded value for the pre-event and post-event 3. Post-event 3 refers to the 
months including 200606-200608. Pre-event refers to the months including 200509-200511. Stocks 
are grouped by trade types only. The t-test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for the difference in 
means between the two periods. ***, **, and * denotes significance in difference of means at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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TABLE 31: REGRESSION ESTIMATIONS OF TRADED VALUE 
OLS (1a) FIX (1a) OLS (2a) FIX (2a) OLS (5a) OLS (6a) OLS (7a) OLS (8a)
(Tval) i,t (Tval) i,t (Tval) i,t (Tval) i,t (Tval) i,t (Tval) i,t (Tval) i,t (Tval) i,t
(Tval) i,t-1 0.9354 0.9268 1.1198 1.1125 0.9353 1.11968 0.9132 1.1079
(478.98)*** (445.13)*** ( 209.07)*** (207.04 )*** ( 478.65  )*** (209.02)*** (620.76)*** (279.60)*** 
(Tval) i,t-2 -0.0278 -0.0285 -0.0278 -0.0027
( -2.54)*** (-2.60)*** (-2.53)*** ( -0.30)
(Tval) i,t-3 -0.187 -0.1803 -0.187 -0.2572
(-14.06 )*** (-13.55)*** ( -14.06 )*** (-22.03)***
(Tval) i,t-4 0.01674 0.0066 0.0167 0.0548
( 1.74 )* (0.69  ) (1.73)
 
* ( 7.13)***
(Vol) i,t -20.1352 1.0028 -67.4981 -41.3632 80.2678 29.4265 111.5034 53.8559
( -0.12 ) (0.01) (-0.42) (-0.26 ) (  0.46 ) (0.17) ( 1.02 ) ( 0.51)
(Esp)i,t 904.4881 884.0045 870.768 845.4987 886.7381 853.6612 515.5163 438.9154
(3.46)*** ( 3.37)*** (  3.38 )*** (3.27 )*** (  3.39)*** ( 3.31)*** ( 2.93)*** (2.56)***
(ln Mcap) i,t 593.8177 713.2673 595.8962 715.3089 428.072 528.9207
(13.04)*** ( 15.75)*** (  13.08)*** (15.79)*** (13.74)*** (17.33 )***
(LOBDBrokmktshare)  i,t -8497.74867 -8207.8703
( -40.14 )*** (-39.74)***
(trend)  i,t -1.9581 -1.8903
(-1.55 ) (-1.52) 
(BIdDum) i,t -345.8208 -352.8776 -374.4115 -384.1991 -113.9474 -150.5913 -87.7377 -105.8194
(-2.15 )** ( -2.19)** (-2.36)** ( -2.41)** (-0.52 ) (-0.69) (-0.81) ( -1.00)
Intercept Tvalue -2425.457 3011.3379 -2787.71326 3784.4602 -2657.5227 -3011.8893 4829.2944 4336.78686
(-4.31)*** (2.55)*** (-5.02 )*** (3.25)*** (-4.57 )*** (-5.24)*** (11.33)*** (10.44)***
R Squared 0.7765 0.7775 0.782 0.7832 0.7765 0.782 0.8779 0.8841
pvalue of F statistic <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
The table reports the regression results for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and the 
Fixed Effects Model (FIX) with the traded value for the whole market as the dependent variable. 
The abbreviations used for the independent variables are in accordance with that described in 
Section 5.2.4. ***,** and * denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively.  
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TABLE 32: REGRESSION ESTIMATIONS OF TRADED VALUE (LOB,DBrok) 
OLS (3a) FIX (3a) OLS (4a) FIX (4a) OLS (9a) OLS (10a)
(Tval) i,LOB,t (Tval) i,LOB,t (Tval) i,LOB,t (Tval) i,LOB,t (Tval) i,LOB,t (Tval) i,LOB,t
(Tval) i,LOB,t-1 0.2218 0.169 -0.0027 -0.0026 0.2456 -0.0024
(166.38 )*** (  138.35 )*** ( -9.12 )*** ( -8.33)*** ( 180.62)*** ( -7.57)***
(Tval) i,LOB,t-2 1.0048 1.0023 1.004
(176.23 )*** (175.58 )*** ( 175.93)***
(Tval) i,LOB,t-3 -0.048 -0.048 -0.0477
(-7.13)*** ( -7.12)*** ( -7.09)***
(Tval) i,LOB,t-4 0.0354 0.0332 0.0354
(7.76)*** ( 7.27 )*** ( 7.77 )*** 
(Vol) i,t 321.1094 446.744 17.3293 20.8419 333.7301 17.5688
( 3.96 )*** (6.48 )***  (1.12 ) ( 1.35 ) (4.21)*** (1.13)
(Esp)i,t 4102.1462 3806.7461 80.8297 93.2771 4136.4861 82.8508
(31.44 )*** (34.18 )***  (3.22 )*** (3.70)*** (32.44)*** (3.30)*** 
(ln Mcap) i,t 4028.569 70.4777 4237.5897 74.0603
(174.07)*** (13.52)*** (185.27)*** (13.80)*** 
(LOBDBrokmktshare)  i,t 9085.8607 83.0828
( 61.05)*** (2.79)*** 
(BIdDum) i,t -1050.252 -803.7623 -15.7713 -14.0977 -1207.9059 -17.6437
(-13.07)*** (-11.73)*** (-1.03) (-0.91 ) (-15.37)*** ( -1.15)  
Intercept Tvalue -19054 22230 -391.8408 371.6739 -27590 -477.7653
(-67.74)*** ( 44.28)*** ( -7.08 )*** (  3.25 )*** ( -89.46)*** (-7.54)*** 
R Squared 0.5624 0.6845 0.984 0.9841 0.5822 0.984
pvalue of F statistic  <.0001 <.0001   <.0001   <.0001   <.0001   <.0001    
 
The table reports the regression results for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and the 
Fixed Effects Model (FIX) with the traded value for the trades represented by different brokers 
(LOB,DBrok) as the dependent variable. The abbreviations used for the independent variables are 
in accordance with that described in Section 5.2.4. ***,** and * denotes significance of the 
coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
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TABLE 33: REGRESSION ESTIMATIONS OF EFFECTIVE SPREAD  
OLS (1b) FIX (1b) OLS (2b) FIX (2b) OLS (5b) OLS (6b) OLS (7b) OLS (8b)
(Esp)i,t (Esp)i,t (Esp)i,t (Esp)i,t (Esp)i,t (Esp)i,t (Esp)i,t (Esp)i,t 
(Esp) i,t-1 0.9897 0.99 1.0761 1.076 0.99 1.0761 0.99 1.0756
( 1980.69)*** (1971.77)*** (750.92)*** ( 750.11)*** (1978.73)*** (750.74)*** (2023.73)*** ( 770.61)***
(Esp) i,t-2 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.1165
(43.89)*** ( 43.84 )*** ( 43.89)*** ( 45.66)*** 
(Esp) i,t-3 -0.2538 -0.2534 -0.2538 -0.1977
( -53.81)*** (-53.67 )*** ( -53.81)*** ( -41.61)*** 
(Esp) i,t-4 0.0446 0.0443 0.0446 -0.0128
(10.45)*** ( 10.36 )*** (10.45)*** (-2.95)***
(Vol) i,t 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0005
( 1.02) (  1.01) (-1.89)*  (-1.88 )* (1.25) (-1.79)*  (1.22 ) ( -1.89)* 
(Tval) i,t 2.71E-08 2.96E-08 2.55E-08 2.74E-08 2.70E-08 2.55E-08 5.30E-09 6.00E-09
(7.86)***
  
( 8.12)*** (8.18)*** ( 8.33)*** ( 7.83)*** ( 8.18)*** (1.30) ( 1.65 )*  
(ln Mcap) i,t -0.00004 0.00004 -0.00004 0.00004 0.00007 0.0002
(-0.47) (0.56 ) ( -0.45) ( 0.56) (0.86) ( 2.27 )**
(LOBmktshare)  i,t -0.0011 -0.0002
( -1.79)* (-0.44)
(trend)  i,t -0.000002 2.05E-07
(-0.82 ) ( 0.09) 
(BIdDum) i,t 0.000007 0.00003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002
(0.02 ) (0.09) ( 1.20) ( 1.33) (0.58) (0.81) (-0.34 ) ( 0.85 ) 
Intercept Esp -0.0011 -0.00182 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0013 0.0009 -0.0008 0.0005
(-1.02) ( -0.81 ) ( 0.91 ) ( 0.39) ( -1.20) (0.90)  (-0.66 ) (  0.51) 
R Squared 0.9805 0.9805 0.9841 0.9841 0.9805 0.9841 0.9813 0.9849
pvalue of F statistic <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   
 
The table reports the regression results for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and the 
respectively.  
Fixed Effects Model (FIX) with the effective spread for the whole market as the dependent variable. 
The abbreviations used for the independent variables are in accordance with that described in 
Section 5.2.4. ***,** and * denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
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TABLE 34: REGRESSION ESTIMATIONS OF EFFECTIVE SPREAD (LOB,DBrok) 
OLS (3b) FIX (3b) OLS (4b) FIX (4b) OLS (9b) OLS (10b)
(Esp)i,LOB,t Esp)i,LOB,t (Esp)i,LOB,t (Esp)i,LOB,t (Esp)i,LOB,t (Esp)i,LOB,t 
(Esp) i,LOB,t-1 0.87245 0.87 0.0016 0.0016 0.8718 0.0016
(729.40 )*** ( 720)*** ( 7.15 )*** (7.18)*** (728.07)*** (7.16 )***
(Esp) i,LOB,t-2 1.9526 1.9526 1.9525
(864.64)*** (864.57)*** (864.62 )***
(Esp) i,LOB,t-3 -1.2793 -1.2782 -1.2792
(-144.41)*** (-144.22)***  (-144.40 )*** 
(Esp) i,LOB,t-4 0.3251 0.324 0.3251
( 38.73 )*** (38.57)*** (  38.72)***
(Vol) i,t 0.0002 0.0003 0.000006 0.000007 0.0002 0.000006
(  0.63 ) ( 0.74 ) ( 0.24 ) (0.28) (   0.65) ( 0.24) 
(Tval) i,t 3.98E-08 4.19E-08 1.11E-09 1.21E-09 5.72E-08 1.23E-09
( 8.71)*** (8.59)*** ( 3.55)*** (3.63)*** (11.51 )*** (3.63)***  
(ln Mcap) i,t 0.0007 -0.000001 0.0008 -4.44E-07
(  6.61)*** (-0.18) ( 7.71)*** (-0.06) 
(LOBmktshare)  i,t 0.0064 0.00005
( 8.90)*** (0.94) 
(BIdDum) i,t -0.0002 -0.0001 0.00004 0.00004 -0.0003 0.00004
(-0.64) ( -0.35) (1.49 ) (1.63)* (  -0.89 ) ( 1.46) 
Intercept Esp -0.005 0.0009 -0.00008 -0.0001 -0.0109 -0.0001
( -3.89 )*** (  0.34 ) (-0.87) (-0.54) (-7.55)*** (-1.20)
R Squared 0.8736 0.8744 0.9994 0.9994 0.8737 0.9994
pvalue of F statistic <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
 
The table reports the regression results for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and the 
Fixed Effects Model (FIX) with the effective spread for the trades represented by different brokers 
(LOB,DBrok) as the dependent variable. The abbreviations used for the independent variables are 
in accordance with that described in Section 5.2.4. ***,** and * denotes significance of the 
coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
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TABLE 35: REGRESSION ESTIMATIONS OF VOLATILITY  
OLS (1c) FIX (1c) OLS (2c) FIX (2c) OLS (5c) OLS (6c) OLS (7c) OLS (8c)
(Vol) i,t (Vol) i,t (Vol) i,t (Vol) i,t (Vol) i,t (Vol) i,t (Vol) i,t (Vol) i,t
(Vol) i,t-1 1.0099 1.0099 1.8394 1.8395 1.0111 1.8393 1.01 1.8098
(4651.00)*** ( 4642.36 )*** ( 300.41)*** (299.96 )*** (4330.38 )*** ( 300.39)*** (4982.41 )*** (335.62)***
(Vol) i,t-2 -0.8346 -0.835 -0.8344 -0.7497
(-66.91)*** (-66.87 )*** (-66.89)*** (-67.52)***  
(Vol) i,t-3 0.118 0.1186 0.1184 0.0393
( 10.21 )*** ( 10.26 )*** ( 10.25)*** (  3.82)***
(Vol) i,t-4 -0.1232 -0.1234 -0.124 -0.0997
( -20.42)*** ( -20.43 )*** (-20.52)*** ( -18.80)*** 
(Esp)i,t 
(Tval) i,t
(ln Mcap) i,t -2.53E-07 -1.07E-07 -0.00002 0.000003 0.00004 0.00004
(-0.00) ( -0.00) (-0.29 ) ( 0.05) ( 0.60) ( 0.83) 
(num_trades) i,t -1.68E-07 -6.57E-07 -1.96E-08 -3.72E-08 -1.00E-07 -2.84E-08 -1.89E-07 -4.03E-08
( -1.82 )* (-3.91)*** ( -0.29 ) ( -0.31 ) ( -1.09 ) (-0.43) ( -2.18 )** ( -0.69)
(LOBmktshare)  i,t 0.0002 0.0002
( 0.64) (0.77) 
(trend)  i,t -0.00002 0.000003
( -14.08 )*** (2.57)*** 
(BIdDum) i,t -0.0026 -0.0025 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.00276 0.0001
(-12.27 )*** ( -11.83 )*** (1.69)* (1.63)* ( 0.56 ) ( -0.49) ( -13.85)*** ( 0.92) 
Intercept Vol -0.0282 -0.0254 0.0011 0.0012 -0.0308 0.0015 -0.0289 0.0004
(-35.67 )*** (-14.68)*** ( 1.86 )** (0.97) (-37.97 )*** (  2.43)** (-34.50)*** (  0.66) 
R Squared 0.9968 0.9968 0.9983 0.9983 0.9968 0.9983 0.9972 0.9987
pvalue of F statistic <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
 
The table reports the regression results for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and the 
Fixed Effects Model (FIX) with the volatility for the whole market as the dependent variable. The 
abbreviations used for the independent variables are in accordance with that described in Section 
5.2.4. ***,** and * denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
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TABLE 36: REGRESSION ESTIMATIONS OF VOLATILITY (LOB,DBrok) 
OLS (3c) FIX (3c) OLS (4c) FIX (4c) OLS (9c) OLS (10c)
(Vol) i,LOB,t (Vol) i,LOB,t (Vol) i,LOB,t (Vol) i,LOB,t (Vol) i,LOB,t (Vol) i,LOB,t
(Vol) i,LOB,t-1 1.0072 1.0072 1.8798 1.8793 1.007 1.8798
( 4087.70 )*** (4089.66 )*** (345.89  )*** (345.51)*** ( 4087.35)*** (345.89)***  
(Vol) i,LOB,t-2 -0.889 -0.8884 -0.889
(-73.59 )*** (-73.49)*** (  -73.59)*** 
(Vol) i,LOB,t-3 0.0891 0.0898 0.0892
( 7.13 )*** (  7.17 )*** ( 7.13)*** 
(Vol) i,LOB,t-4 -0.0814 -0.0821 -0.0814
(-13.29 )*** (-13.40 )*** ( -13.30)***
(ln Mcap) i,t 0.000002 8.28E-07 0.000002 0.000001
( 1.60)* (  0.87  ) ( 1.61)* ( 1.06 )
(num_trades) i,t 5.98E-11 1.41E-09 -3.12E-10 -5.92E-10 7.36E-12 -4.20E-10
( 0.03 ) ( 0.45) (  -0.25) ( -0.26) (0.00) (-0.34)
(LOBmktshare)  i,t 0.000002 0.000004
( 0.28 ) ( 0.80) 
(BIdDum) i,t -0.000009 -0.000009 5.93E-07 9.51E-07 -0.00001 5.14E-07
(-2.51 )** (-2.43)** ( 0.22 ) ( 0.35 ) (-2.52)** ( 0.19) 
Intercept Vol -0.00008 -0.00007 0.000006 0.00002 -0.00008 0.000002
( -8.23)*** ( -2.16 )** ( 0.92) (0.69 ) (  -6.49)*** (0.20) 
R Squared 0.9953 0.9953 0.9976 0.9976 0.9953 0.9976
pvalue of F statistic  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
 
 
The table reports the regression results for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and the 
Fixed Effects Model (FIX) with the volatility for the trades represented by different brokers 
(LOB,DBrok) as the dependent variable. The abbreviations used for the independent variables are 
in accordance with that described in Section 5.2.4. ***,** and * denotes significance of the 
coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
118 
 
119 
 
 
